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Physicists have begun to look into the underlying mechanisms for global be-
haviour exhibited in a population consisting of competing agents. An im-
portant example is that of stock markets, the study of which has led to the 
establishment of econophysics as a new area of physics research. Studies on the 
statistical properties of financial data revealed that the underlying mechanism 
is different from that of a random walk process. Many agent-based models 
have been proposed as microscopic models of stock market. In this thesis, we 
study the statistical properties of the indices of the NYSE and Shanghai stock 
markets. A few agent-based models are also studied. These include the model 
/ 
of herd formation and information transmission proposed by Eguiluz and Zim-
mermann (EZ model), and the Minority Game (MG) proposed by Challet and 
Zhang. 
Several methods are used to analyze the NYSE and the Shanghai indices. 
It is shown that the both indices do not follow random walk process, a result 
consistent with studies on other markets. Instead, the probability density 
of log-ret urns, i.e., the logarithmic of the difference in prices for fixed time 
difference, exhibits a Levy distribution with a fat tail for large returns rather 
than a Gaussian distribution. 
Variations on the EZ model of herd formation and information transmis-
sion in a population are studied numerically and analytically. A size-dependent 
transaction rate is introduced. This leads to a tunable model-dependent ex-
ponent for the returns distribution and gives a crossover between regions of 
i 
different power laws in the return distribution, as observed in some financial 
data. A tunable exponent also results when a size-dependent rate for the 
dissociation of cluster of agents is introduced. 
The Minority Game (MG) consists of agents competing for limited re-
sources. The agents decide based on information shared globally. We propose 
and study several models with the aim of exploring ways for which an agent 
or a group of agents can achieve an enhanced success rate. We study a gener-
alized version of the MG with a biased pool of strategies, i.e., some strategies 
are more often picked by the agents than others, as a model in which the 
agents are more willing to buy or sell a stock. It is found that the standard 
deviation in the number of agents making similar decisions is suppressed in 
the crowded or efficient phases of the MG. As an effort to study ways to win 
in the MG, we study a MG in which one agent (or a few agents) participates 
in the game in random turns. It is found that the such agent(s) can avoid 
the over-adaptation in the efficient phase and hence performs (perform) better 
than agents who participant in the game every turn. In real life, one does 
not always compete only in one repeated games, but several. We also study 
a model of coupled minority games in which two MGs are played at the same 
time by one population of agents and the agents are allowed to shift between 
the two MGs. The success rate of the agents is found to be enhanced. The 
underlying physics of the enhanced performance in the new models is that the 
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Complex adaptive systems have become an area of intensive research in recent 
years. Typical of these systems are agents, i.e., the basic entities in the systems, 
competing for limited resources. These agents have the ability to learn from 
past experience and adapt to the changing environment. The performance 
of the agent is recorded and usually is used as a feedback mechanism for 
learning and adaptive behaviour. The changing environment is usually the 
result of the collective actions of the agents. The agents are thus effectively 
interacting through the consequence of their actions. Examples of such systems 
are the bar-attendance problems [3] in which a population of agents try to 
get into a bar every weekend without encountering a crowd that exceeds the 
seating capacity of the bar and the minority game [4] in which a population of 
agents repeatedly compete to be in a minority group. Both these models were 
proposed as simplified models of financial markets. In financial markets, more 
buyers than sellers implies higher prices which is profitable for the sellers. 
Another recent development in physics is the establishment of a new branch 
called econophysics [5, 6，7]. This area introduces the applications of ideas and 
knowledges in physics to the analysis and modeling of financial data. In recent 
years, many conferences on econophysics have been organized. Many research 
articles on econophysics have been published in regular physics journals and 
in new journals devoted entirely to the area of econophysics. Physicists have 
1 
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contributed to discovery and understanding of novel features in financial mar-
kets. Much work has been done to understand the statistical features and 
many theoretical models have been proposed to explain the mechanism of the 
financial markets. 
The availability of high frequency financial data ensures that accurate 
statistics can be done. The distribution of price fluctuations is one of the 
most basic properties of financial markets. In recent years, physicists have 
discovered novel features in financial data, partly due to the availability of 
good-quality high frequency data sets and partly due to the fresh viewpoints 
from physicists' eyes. To demonstrate such recent developments and to bring 
out the important features, we study the statistical properties of two seemingly 
very different indices, namely the NYSE and the Shanghai composite indices, 
in Chapter 2. We show that the distributions of price fluctuations of the in-
dices are not the result of simple random walk processes as usually assumed 
in standard finance theories [8]. The distributions show Levy distribution in 
the central part and exhibit power law behaviour in the tails. On the other 
hand, the price fluctuations of the Shanghai index show a short term correla-
tion over several minutes. However, the amplitudes of the price fluctuations of 
the Shanghai index show a long term correlation over months. The results are 
consistent with the studies on other markets [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Some universal 
features are found to be shared among different stock markets. 
Many theoretical models have been proposed to explain the underlying 
features of the financial markets. One approach is to propose a mathematical 
model for the markets. The ARCH process introduced by Engle [14] and 
the GARCH process introduced by Bollerslev [15], for example, consider the 
stochastic processes in which the random numbers, representing the index 
prices, are normally distributed with the spreading of the distribution (the 
variance) depending on the outcomes of the last few turns. These processes 
successfully describe the returns distribution for a given time horizon (At), 
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but fail to describe the scaling properties for different time horizons, i.e.，the 
probability of zero returns as a function of At [6]. In this thesis, we will discuss 
an alternative approach, namely that of constructing and using agent-based 
models to simulate market operations. Agent-based models typically consist of 
a population of agents who follow some simple rules for their actions. The aim 
of agent-based models is to study how the global (macroscopic) behaviour can 
be affected by the (microscopic) behaviour of the agents. Agent-based models 
have a wide range of applications, e.g. in modeling traffic flow problems and 
agent behaviour in stock markets, just to name a couple. 
Following the model proposed by Cont and Bouchaud [16], Egu/luz and 
Zimmerman proposed a model (EZ model) to study the link between the for-
mation of herding behaviour and the fat tails in financial indices [17]. Herding 
behaviour refers to the formation of clusters of agents with similar opinion. 
In the model, a cluster of agents may merge together with another cluster to 
form a single cluster if the members do not make a transaction collectively and 
the cluster dissociates if the members trade collectively. All the members in 
a cluster make the same decision due to herding behaviour and information 
transmission within the cluster. The pure return is then driven by the excess 
demands between the clusters. In this model, the returns distribution shows 
a power law with an exponent�1.5. The EZ model and several variations 
are reviewed in Chapter 3. We introduce a new model in which there is a 
finite probability for clusters to dissociate without making transactions. The 
model gives a crossover between regions of different power laws in the returns 
distribution, as observed in some financial data. 
The Minority Game (MG) proposed by Challet and Zhang is one of the 
most popular agent-based models of competing population in recent years [4 . 
The MG is a model of a competing population for limited resources. In the 
real world, being in the minority group is preferable in many situations. More 
buyers than sellers in a stock market implies higher prices which is profitable 
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for the sellers. For a driver choosing between two alternative routes, she would 
like to choose a route with less vehicles. In the MG, N agents should make 
decisions between two options and they compete to be in the minority side. 
Although all the agents decide their actions independently, they are able to 
self-organize themselves to improve their overall performance in the game. To 
motivate the work on MG in later chapters of the thesis, we review the model 
of the basic MG and some of the important results in Chapter 4. 
An important problem on MG is to explore ways in which resources can be 
distributed more efficiently in the population. In Chapter 5, we introduce a 
model, based on the MG, with a biased strategy pool. It is found that under 
appropriate condition, a biased strategy pool leads to a high average success 
rate for the agents. In Chapter 6, we propose a version of the MG in which 
one or a few agents are allowed to join the game with a probability. These 
randomly participating agents out-perform the other agents. In Chapter 7, we 
study a model of two coupled MGs, in which the agents are allowed to attend 
either one of the two MGs in each time step. This again leads to a better 
performance of the agents, implying a more efficient resources distribution. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the work reported in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 
The Distribution of 
Fluctuations in Financial Data 
Financial markets, being a complex dynamical system, have attracted the in-
terest of physicists in recent years. Much work has been done on studying the 
underlying statistical features of stock markets. Gopikrisknan et al [9, 10] and 
Mantegna et al [11] have studied the S&P500 index in great detail Plerou et 
al have studied the AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE indices [12]. Wang and Hui 
have studied the Hang Seng index [13]. Some universal features are found to be 
shared among different stock markets. The results show that the dynamics of 
the stock market is not the results of simple random walk processes as usually 
assumed in standard finance theories [8]. In this Chapter, we will illustrate 
the features by analyzing the NYSE index and the Shanghai index. 
2.1 Empirical Statistics 
The distribution of price fluctuations is one of the most basic properties of 
financial markets. In the past, due to the lacking of high frequency data, 
the distribution of price fluctuations cannot be analyzed in detail. In recent 
years, Gopikrishnan et al [9] studied the price fluctuations of 1000 individual 
5 
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companies and the S&P500 index. They reported that the distribution of 5-
minutes returns decays as a power law with the exponent — (1 + a) for 
large returns. Let X{t) be the price (or index) of the quantity at time t, the 
return rAt(t) can be defined as 
r八“t) 二 log 耶 + At) - log 耶)， （2.1) 
where At is the time interval between two data points. Plerou et al [12] studied 
the high frequency returns distribution for the AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE 
indices. They found that for At ranges from 5 minutes to approximately 
16 days, the returns distribution of all these indices can be described by a 
power law decaying with an exponent —(1 + a) ^-4. For At�16 days, the 
results are consistent with slow convergence to Gaussian behaviour as required 
by the central limit theorem. Mantegna et al [11] and Gopikrishnan et al [10 
studied the S&P500 index, they found that there is a crossover from one power 
law to another with different exponents. For the central part of the returns 
distribution, i.e., for small returns, the distribution can be described by a 
power law with an exponent — (1 + a) w -2.7, for which o； < 2 corresponds 
to the Levy regime. For large returns, the distribution can be described by 
a power law with exponent —(1 + a) « —4, for which a > 2 is outside the 
Levy regime. The above results show that for all the indices considered, their 
returns distributions show a global behaviour of power law decay. For large 
returns, the power law has an exponent?=:i-4. It is known as the fat tail feature. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, it is believed that all avail-
able information is immediately reflected in the new price of the assets traded 
6]. Since all the information is immediately reflected, we cannot predict the 
movement of the index by its historical movements. According to the central 
limit theorem, if the price changes are independent and identically distributed 
with a well defined second moment, the cumulative distribution of returns, 
i.e., the distribution of rAt{t) for large At, should converge to the Gaussian 
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distribution. However, studies on returns distribution show that the conver-
gence of empirical market data is very slow. It implies that the returns cannot 
be simply considered as independent random variables. Understanding the 
underlying features of stock markets and their mechanisms are still topics of 
active debate. 
To explore the features of the returns time series, it is useful to study the 
autocorrelation function of the returns. The autocorrelation function, c(r), of 
a time series Xi, where 2,. . . , N, is 
1 Y ^ A T - r r _ - - i r _ 
/ � TT^ 2^i=l V^i _ J^ R+r - J^ , � 
二 IvN ( _ ’ （2.2) 
where x is the mean value of Xi, i.e., 
1 N 
无 = ( 2 . 3 ) 
The autocorrelation function measures the relation between data points Xi 
and Xi^r- For 0 < c(r) < 1, the two data points tend to change in the same 
direction. For c(r) 二 0, two data points are uncorrelated. For - 1 < c(r) < 0, 
the two data points separated by r tend to change in opposite directions. 
It is found that the autocorrelation functions of the returns of the indices 
considered decay to the level of noise within 20 minutes [6, 10，18], and for 
r < 20 minutes, c(r) >0. It implies that all the information available will 
be reflected on the price within a short time, although not instantaneously. 
However, the autocorrelation function of the volatility exhibits a long-range 
correlation of several months [6, 10, 18]. The volatility at time t is defined as 
the root-mean-square of returns over a time window of width T, i.e., 
volatility 二 j^, , (2.4) 
where N' is the number of data points of r^tit) within the duration T. The 
volatility measures the amplitudes of the changes in the returns. It is shown 
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that the autocorrelation function of the volatility decays as a power law with 
an exponent v, where 0.1 < " < 0.3 [7]. The long range correlation of the 
volatility is known as volatility clustering. 
2.2 Data analyzed 
The database of NYSE index covers a period of 35 years from 1966 to 2000 
19]. The data are recorded daily, i.e., the time separation between two data 
points is one day. There are a total 8812 data points. Figure 2.1 shows the 
NYSE index in the period considered. 
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Figure 2.1: The NYSE index from 1966 to 2000. 
In our analysis, we will consider the return, rAt(t), of the NYSE index 
for At=l , i.e., the return for a one-day separation. The return, as defined in 
Eq.(2.1), measures the change of the index. 
The data of the Shanghai index cover a period from 1 August 2000 to 3 
April 2001 [20]. The data are recorded every 10 seconds, and hence these are 
high frequency data. There are a total 227679 data points. Figure 2.2 shows 
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the Shanghai index in the period considered. 
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Date 
Figure 2.2: The Shanghai index from 1/8/2000 to 3/4/2001. 
It was found that there are daily pattern of market activities in financial 
markets [13]. Since the Shanghai data are recorded in 10-second intervals, we 
need to remove the daily pattern in the data so that it will not affect long 
term statistics. The return of the Shanghai index, r^t, is defined in Eq.(2.1), 
with At=l referring to a 10-second separation. For time tnay in a day, the 
intra-day pattern A{tDay) is defined as 
雄z^ad 三 (2-5) 
i=l 
where the sum is over the N trading days in the data [13]. It is an average of 
the magnitude of price changes at time tnay in a day. The intra-day pattern 
of the Shanghai market is shown in Fig. 2.3. It shows that the market is more 
active near the opening and closing of the market. 
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Figure 2.3: Intra-day Pattern, A{tBay)-> of the Shanghai index. 
To remove the intra-day pattern, we define a new return �At(力）by 
" A t � -r U ^ ) l A { t D a y ) . (2.6) 
where t is the time of recording the data and toay is the time in a day. For 
example, for a data point recorded at 2:30 pm on 1 November 2000,力 
November 2000, 2:30 pm and t£)ay=2:30 pm. We will consider gAt{t) in the 
Shanghai index analysis. 
2.3 Levy Distribution 
Mantegna et al [11] and Gopikrishnan et al [10] showed that the central part 
of returns distribution in the S&P500 index can be described by Levy distribu-
tion. Before analysing on the data, we introduce the idea of Levy distribution. 
Levy distribution arises from a generalization of the central limit theorem 
to a wider class of distributions. According to the central limit theorem, if the 
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random variables Xi are independent and identically distributed with a well 
defined second moment, the distribution of S^ 三 should converge to 
a Gaussian distribution in the limit N oo. 
Consider a probability density function of random variable x, P{x), with 
the Fourier transform (it is also called the characteristic function) (p{q) of the 
form 
/ r 
iiiq — 7 0 " 1 + for a �L ’ J (2.7) 
[ w —7M|_1 + 約 叫 ’ fora^l 
where 0< a <2. Here /i is the mean, 7 is a positive number and (5 is an 
asymmetry parameter. For a 二 2 and 卢=0, one obtains the Gaussian 
distribution. For Of < 2, 二 0 and /x 二 0, 
P(xi) = - / cos (qx)dq. (2.8) 
^ Jo 
For 7 二 1 and � 0 , the series expansion of Eq.(2.8) is [6，21 
W ) 注 ^ ^ sin ( ^ ) + W-<^(n+i)-i)’ (2.9) 
fc二 1 
and hence 
P { \ x i \ ) �吃 for > 1 (2.10) 
For a wide range of parameters, the distribution of the form of Eq.(2.7) does 
not satisfy the requirement of the central limit theorem. However, Levy [22 
shows that the distribution of the form of Eq.(2.7) is stable, i.e., for P{xi) with 
(f{q) of the form of Eq.(2.7), the distribution of Sn 三 Zl^i 而 converges to 
a similar functional form of P{xi) with the same value of index a, instead of 
converging to a Gaussian distribution. Therefore, for a < 2, = 0, /i = 0 and 
7 二 1, P�Sn�behaves as 
P { S n ) �f o r � 1 (2.11) 
following Eq.(2.10), The tail of a Levy distribution shows power law behaviour 
with an exponent - ( l+a) , which is less than -3. 
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2.4 Returns Distribution and Scaling Proper-
ties 
The returns distribution shows the global behaviour in a market. We are 
interested in the probability distribution of returns for the NYSE index and 
the Shanghai index. Figure 2.4 shows the returns distribution of the NYSE 
index and Figure 2.5 shows the returns distribution of the Shanghai index. The 
positive tail is the returns distribution of the positive returns. The negative tail 
is the returns distribution of the negative returns. In the figures, the dashed 
line shows a power law with an exponent -4. 
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Figure 2.4: Log-log plot of the returns distribution of NYSE index. The dashed 
line shows a power law with an exponent -4. 
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Figure 2.5: Log-log plot of the returns distribution of Shanghai index. The 
dashed line shows a power law with an exponent -4. 
In both the NYSE and Shanghai indices, the returns distributions show a 
power law dependence with an exponent -4 for large returns. 
To explore the features in the central part of the returns distributions, 
we consider the probability of zero returns, i.e., F(rAt = 0) for the NYSE 
index and P(gAt = 0) for the Shanghai index, for different time horizons. For 
random variables xi and X2, consider S2 三 工i 二工1 + 工2, The probability 
distribution of S2, is 
P(S2) = r Pjy低人S2 — y)dy, (2.12) 
J —00 
where (y) is the probability distribution of Xi and Px2{y) is the probability 
distribution of X2. If the Fourier transform of P ^ M and Px2{y) is by 
the convolution theorem, the Fourier transform of P[S2), p{q), is 
p{q) 二 咖 � ( p ( q ) = ^{qY- (2.13) 
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Consider (p{q) of the form of Eq.(2.7) with (3 = 0 (symmetric distribution) and 
M = 0 (distribution with zero mean), i.e., 
� = e — ( 2 . 1 4 ) 
P{S2) become 
P{S2) = - r e-场I" cos {qS2)dq. (2.15) 
TT Jq 
Therefore, for 二0 
P(S2 = 0) = - H t t " - (2.16) 
V ,體(27)1/" 、 ) 
Generalizing to Sn 三 X ] � i 而，we have 
P(Q) = , (2.17) 
and 
参 = (2.18) 
Hence assuming the distribution of returns to be the Levy type given by 
Eq.(2.7) with f] 二 jj = 0, the probability of zero returns with time horizon At 
is 
户(〜= = （2.19) 
The result implies that a log-log plot of P{rAt = 0) as a function of At is 
a straight line of slope -K We have tested the probability of zero returns of 
the NYSE index and Shanghai index. Figure 2.6 shows the probability of zero 
returns, P{rAt 二 0), of the NYSE index. The data fall on a straight line of 
slope -0.692, implying a 二 1.45. Figure 2.7 shows the the probability of zero 
returns, P{gAt = 0), of the Shanghai index. The data fall on a straight line of 
slope -0.696, implying a = 1.44. 
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Figure 2.6: The probability of zero returns, P(rAt = 0), as a function of At of 
the NYSE index. The solid line shows a straight line of slope -0.692. 
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Figure 2.7: The probability of zero returns, P{gM = 0), as a function of At of 
the Shanghai index. The solid line shows a straight line of slope -0.696. 
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In both NYSE and Shanghai indices, the probability of zero returns matches 
Eq.(2.7) with a ^ 1.44 (recall that for Gaussian, a = 2), implying that the 
central part of the returns distribution can be described by a Levy distribu-
tion. In Ref.[10], Gopikrishnan et al showed a crossover from one power law 
behaviour having an exponent?^-2.7 to another power law behaviour having 
an exponentf^-4 for the S&P500 index. For the central part of the returns 
distribution, it is a Levy type distribution with a ^1.7. For large returns, the 
power law has an exponent -4. Similar results are found in our analysis. 
For Levy and Gaussian distributions, scaling behaviour can be exhibited 
by defining 
Psir^At)三 P(rAt)A力"a and r ^ , 三 蟲 . (2.20) 
For the NYSE index, Fig. 2.8 shows the P(jAt) for different time horizons At 
and Fig. 2.9 shows the rescaled returns distribution, with a 二 1.45 
for different time horizons At. 
NYSE index 
0.1 1 1 1  
- © -
〇 
0 . 0 8 - -o 
- 〇〇 -
O A?=1 
0.06 - 〇• •a?=2 — 
1 - ^ o At=3 -
务 A A/=4 
0 . 0 4 - 来 -
0.0. ‘ ^ ^ -
0 m t i ^ r 1-^Mifeii^itoiD A • 
- 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 2 5 0 0 . 0 2 5 0 . 0 5 
Figure 2.8: The returns distribution, F(rAt), of NYSE index for At=l, 2, 3，4 
and 5. 
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Figure 2.9: The rescaled returns distribution, with a — 1.45 of NYSE 
index for At=l, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
For the Shanghai index, Fig. 2.10 shows the P{gAt) for different time horizons 
At and Fig. 2.11 shows the rescaled returns distribution, Ps�g%dh with a = 
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Figure 2.10: The returns distribution, Pig At), of Shanghai index for A力=1, 2, 
4, 8, 16 and 32. 
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Figure 2.11: The rescaled returns distribution, Ps{gAt)^ with a = 1.44 of 
Shanghai index for At=l, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32. 
We see that after rescaling, the returns distributions for different time 
horizons collapse onto each other. Figure 2.12 shows the returns distribution 
of Shanghai index for At=l. The solid line is a fitting Levy distribution 
with a=lA4：, as determined in Fig. 2.7. The agreement of the empirical 
data and the solid line is very good in the central part of the distribution. 
For large returns, the data decay faster than the Levy distribution. Noting 
that for all Levy distribution with a < 2, the second moment (and all other 
higher moments) of the distribution does not exist. The fast decaying tails 
for large returns ensure that the second moment exists and hence the returns 
distribution will converge to a Gaussian for long time horizon according to the 
central limit theorem. The convergence to Gaussian distribution was observed 
in S&P500 for time horizon greater than 16 days [12]. The dotted line in Fig. 
2.12 is a Gaussian distribution having the same standard deviation as the data. 
It shows that the returns distribution is not a normal distribution, as usually 
assumed in standard finance theories [8 • 
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Figure 2.12: Log-log plot of the returns distribution of Shanghai index for 
A力二 1. The solid line is a fit to a Levy distribution with a二 1.44. The dotted 
line is a Gaussian distribution having the same standard deviation as the data. 
2.5 Volatility Clustering 
In the previous section, we have shown that the returns distributions of the 
NYSE index and Shanghai index can be described by a Levy distribution in 
the central part and a power law with exponent�4 for large returns. For 
both distributions (Levy and Gaussian), it is assumed that the returns are 
independent, i.e., the return at any time is uncorrelated to the returns at 
earlier time. In this section, we explore the feature of volatility clustering in 
the time series of the data. 
To investigate the time series, we calculate the autocorrelation function of 
the NYSE index and Shanghai index. The autocorrelation function, c(r) for a 
time series Xi, where i=l, 2” ..，N, is given by Eq.(2.2). The autocorrelation 
function measures the relation between data points Xi and oOi+T. Figure 2.13 
shows the autocorrelation function of the returns gAt{t) and the volatility of 
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the Shanghai index for A力二 1. The volatility, defined as the the root-mean-
square of returns over a time window in Eq.(2.4), measures the amplitude of 
the changes of the returns. The inset shows the autocorrelation function of the 
returns for the first 20 minutes. The figure shows that the returns only show 
a short time correlation for several minutes�However, the volatility shows a 
correlation over 10 days. This feature is called volatility clustering. In the 
studies on S&P500 index, the feature of volatility clustering was found to last 
for 2 months [6, 10]. In our study on the Shanghai index, we do not explore 
the possible correlation over a time scale of a month, because of the limitation 
on the size of the data set. 
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Figure 2.13: The autocorrelation function of the returns gAt{t) and volatility 
for the Shanghai index. The inset shows the autocorrelation function of the 
returns for the first 20 minutes. 
The changes of the returns are long term correlated. This implies that the 
returns are not independent. The second moment of the returns (the volatility) 
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are correlated. Therefore, the assumption that the returns are independent is 
not observed in the data. The distributions discussed and used in the literature 
only provide a theoretical framework for future work. More works are needed 
to explore the underlying statistical features in financial market. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we studied the statistical features of the NYSE index and 
Shanghai index. For the NYSE index, the data are recorded daily over a 
period of 35 years. For the Shanghai index, the data are recorded every 10 
seconds and over a period of 8 months. 
We explored the returns distributions of the indices. For both indices, the 
central part of the returns distributions can be described by a Levy distribution 
with a 乂 1.44. For large returns, the returns distributions exhibit a power law 
behaviour with an exponent;^-4. The power law behaviour for large returns 
ensure that the second moment exists. Therefore the distribution will converge 
to a Gaussian distribution for large time horizons. Scaling behaviour were also 
studied. With suitable scaling factor, the data for different time horizons all 
follow the same functional form. 
To explore the correlation in the return time series, we studied the autocor-
relation functions of the returns and the volatility of the Shanghai index. The 
returns only show a short term correlation of several minutes. The volatility 
shows a longer term correlation over several days (volatility clustering). The 
exact period of the volatility clustering is not extracted, due to limitation of 
the size of the data set. The long term correlation of volatility implies that the 
returns are not independent, as usually assumed in standard finance theory. 
Chapter 3 
Models of Herd behaviour in 
Financial Markets 
Recently, physicists are attracted to a wide class of problems concerning the 
macroscopic behaviour in a system consisting of a large number of competing 
agents. Stock market is the one that attracted much attention. Several special 
features are observed in a stock market. One of these special features is that 
the returns distributions of the stock does not exhibit Gaussian distribution. 
Instead, the returns distribution is a power law type (fat tail). On the other 
hand, herding behaviour in financial markets is well documented empirically. 
Some toy models are proposed to explore the links between herding behaviour 
and the fat tails of returns distribution. In this Chapter, we will review some 
of these models and propose several extensions on one of these models, namely 
the EZ model. 
3.1 Cont and Bouchaud's model 
Many microscopic models are proposed to simulate the observed macroscopic 
features of stock markets. Cont and Bouchaud [16] proposed a model (CB 
model) that has attached much attention. The model aims to simulate the 
herding behaviour of agents in stock markets. Herding behaviour refers to the 
22 
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formation of groups of agents with similar opinion in the market. Although 
this phenomenon is well documented by economists, there have been very few 
studies on the cause of herd behaviour. 
In the model, Cont and Bouchaud considered a market with N agents. 
During each time step, the agents decide either to buy a stock, to sell, or not to 
trade. The demand of agent i is denoted by a variable (jx^. The variable 小生 takes 
on the value 1 for buying, -1 for selling, or 0 for not carrying out a transaction. 
The probability of carrying out a transaction is a, regardless buying or selling. 
The value of thus depends on the parameter a. The probability of (^^=1)= 
probability of and the probability of (0产0)=(l-a), as a < 1. To 
simulate the herding behaviour, the agents are connected to other agents to 
form a cluster probabilistically. For any pair of agents i and j, let p be the 
probability that i and j are linked together. Each agent will, on the average, 
be linked to 7V(1 — p) other agents. In order to have a finite value of N{1 —p) 
in the limit N oo, Cont and Bouchaud chose p = where c is a constant. 
Agents in the same cluster are assumed to make the same decision, that is to 
say, to have the same It can be shown that [23] for c=l , the probability 
density P{s) for the cluster size s has the form 
P � 二 ⑷ 各 (3.1) 
where A is constant, and for 0 < 1 — c � 1 , 
P � 二 ⑴ 嘉 — - ( 3 - 2 ) 
where s�is a constant. 
Let X{t) be the price of the stock at time t. The return R{t), is defined 
as the difference of logarithm of the stock price at time t and t 一 1, i.e., 
R{t)三 log(X(t + 1)) — log(X(t)). In CB model, the return is assumed to be 
related to the exceed demands by 
1 N 
(3.3) 
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where A is called the market depth. It measures the exceed demands needed 
to change the return by one unit. 
Empirically, it is observed that the probability distribution function of the 
returns, P{R), scales with R as i^ -(i+。)，where a ^ 3, for large returns in real 
stock market [6, 7]. In the CB model, assuming c < 1 and 2aN remains finite 
when iV —oo, we have 
O g—R/Ro 
n n ) 丑 ， ( 3 . 4 ) 
Therefore, although the returns distribution does behave as …with an 
exponential correction term, the value of the exponent a does not agree with 
that observed in real markets. Moreover, the CB model is static, meaning that 
there is no relationship between the connection of agents in one time step and 
the next. 
3.2 T h e Model of Egmluz and Z i m m e r m a n 
There are several variations on the basic CB model [17, 24, 25]. In particular, 
Egu/luz and Zimmermann generalized the Cont and Bouchaud's model to a 
dynamical self-organized model (EZ model) [17 . 
Consider a market consisting of N agents. At each time step, an agent i is 
selected randomly among the agents. With a probability 1 — a, agent i selects 
one agent j randomly and forms a cluster with j, i.e., the cluster containing i 
and that containing j merge together. With a probability a, agent i decides to 
buy {4>i = 1) or sell ((^ ‘ 二 一 1) the stock, with buying and selling carrying equal 
probability. All the agents belonging to the same cluster as agent i follow the 
same decision, and all the other agents have = 0. After buying or selling 
the stock, the cluster of i dissociates and the agents belonging to that cluster 
break up into isolated agents (clusters of size unity). The above procedure 
is repeated from one time step to another, leading to a dynamical version of 
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the CB model. The evolution of the model is characterized by the formation 
and dissociation of clusters. Let s be the size of the clusters. The probability 
distribution function of 5, shows a power law dependence with exponent 
-5/2. Figure 3.1 shows the numerical result in a log-log plot of the averaged 
distribution, P(s), of cluster sizes s. 
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Figure 3.1: Log-log plot of the averaged distribution of cluster sizes s for 
N 二 10000 and a = 0.01. The solid line shows a power law with exponent 
-5/2. The distribution P{s) shows a power law dependence with exponent 
-5/2. 
The return R is defined in the same way as in Eq.(3.3). The probability 
distribution of the return, P[R), is given by the probability of selecting an 
agent belonging to a cluster of size s, i.e., 
P{R)�P{s) X s �s 部 �R 部 , (3.5) 
as R is related to s by = sjX (see Eq.(3.3)). Figure 3.5 shows the numerical 
results of P{FC) against R. 
Chapter 3 Models of Herd behaviour in Financial Markets 26 
in。  
I \J Z ‘ I I I ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I i I 1 1 I ！ ~ I I I I I = ： 
1 ^ ^ o Positive tail “ 
r * Negative tail 1 
丨 ——_�R—3� -
1 。 、 
—5 \ 
1 Q I I I I, 1_I_1 I I I I I T I _ I _ I I 1 I I 1 I I__I_1 I I I  
1e-05 0.0001 0.001 0.01 
R 
Figure 3.2: Log-log plot of the probability distribution function, P{R), of R 
for the positive return tail (o) and negative return tail (*). N — 10000 and 
a 二 0.01 are used. The solid line shows a power law with exponent -3/2. P{R) 
shows a power law dependence with exponent -3/2, as given by Eq. (3.5). 
D'Hulst and Rodgers carried out an analytic study on the EZ model [26 . 
Let ris denote the number of clusters of size s at time t. The time evolution 
of Us is given by the following equation 
dus 1 - a ^  、 2(1 - a)sns ^  . ^ . 
= -asris + — ^ > ^ rnr[s — r)ns-r > �rn” for 5 > 1 




dni ^ 2 2(1 - a)ni ^ , 、 
=a y r rir — > rn^. tor s — 1 (3.7) 
dt L N L 
r—2 r=l 
In Eq.(3.6), the three terms on the right describe the time evolution of Ug. The 
first term describes a cluster of size s breaking up into isolated agents. The 
second term describes a cluster of size r and a cluster of size s — r merging 
together to form a single cluster of size s. The third term describes a cluster 
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of size s merge with another cluster with size r to form a single cluster of size 
r + s. Similarly in Eq.(3.7), the first describes a cluster of size r breaking up 
into isolated agents. The second term describes a cluster of size 1 and a cluster 
of size r merging together to form a single cluster of size r- + 1. 
It is expected that the system approaches some stationary state in the long 
time limit. In the stationary state, Eq.(3.6) becomes 
1 一 ft “ 
sris = (2 ^ r �( s — (3.8) 
and Eq.(3.7) becomes 
oo 
^ , r=2 
Eq.(3.8) and (3.9) form a set of coupled equations for the asymptotic cluster 
size distribution. The equations can be most conveniently solved by a gener-
ating function approach. Introducing the generating function 
oo 
二;^ rrve-雷， （3.10) 
r—2 
Us can be solved to be (see Appendix A) 
For large s, we have 
"^广 (3.12) 
Thus in the EZ model, the probability distribution of clusters with size s, 
P{s), is proportional to s-叩.This solution agrees with the numerical results 
in Figure 3.1. 
The EZ model is self-organized in the sense that we no longer need to 
specify the value of c defined in the CB model. The connectivity c measures 
the average number of connected agents for each agent. Figure 3.3 shows the 
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evolution of c. For N = 10^  and a = 0.01, we have an average value of c, 
< c >=0.76, with the standard deviation being 0.14. 
1.5 I I 1  
0.5 L 
0 ‘ 1 1  
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 
time step 
Figure 3.3: The evolution of c in the EZ model, a = 0.01 and N = 10000. 
A generalization of EZ model is investigated in [26]. At each time step, an 
agent i is selected randomly. With probability a, agent i decides to buy or sell. 
All the agents belonging to the same cluster follow. After buying or selling the 
stock, the cluster dissociates. With probability 1 — a, agent i randomly select 
m other agents and connect to them. It is found that Us still follows the same 
behaviour with an exponent of -5/2. 
3.3 E Z Model with Size-Dependent Dissocia-
tion Rates 
A variation on EZ model has been proposed by Zheng, Hui and Johnson [1 . 
The model basically follows that of the EZ model. The modification is that 
after the agents in the cluster with the chosen agent i decided to buy or sell, 
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the cluster dissociates only with probability s � �w h e r e Si is the size of the 
cluster and 0 < (5 < 1 is a tunable parameter. With probability 1 一 s:谷,the 
cluster remains unchanged, i.e., the agents remain in a cluster after making 
the same decision. If no transaction are made, an agent j is chosen randomly 
and the two clusters with agents i and j will merge with the probability 
to form a single cluster. With probability the two clusters remain 
separated. 
After introducing this size-dependent probability of dissociation of the clus-
ters, the time evolution equations of Ug become 
N 智二-a 八 + ¥ £ — - r f - � s - r 
口1 (3 13) 
— 2 ( “ / � f > i 、 ， f o r . > l 
r = l 
and 
N ^ = a f v - V - fo…1 (3.14) 
r=2 r=l 
In the stationary state, Eqs.(3.13) and (3.14) can be solved by introducing the 
generating function [1 
oo 
G H = V e - - (3.15) 
For large s, the solution gives 
�4(1 - a) [(1 - a) + ^ o o 11 s ^ 
ris �N ： 2 s 、2 0). (3.16) 
_ [sri^^ + (2 -叫 J 
The exponent of the cluster size distribution and the returns distribution can 
thus be tuned by properly selecting the value of S. Figure 3.4 shows the cluster 
size distribution with different values of S. 
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Figure 3.4: The cluster size distribution for different values of S. (Following 
[I]-) 
The returns distribution, P(R), is given by 
P{R)�P{s) X s �s—(鲁-句�iT(鲁-J). (3.17) 
Figure 3.5 shows the returns distribution for different values of 6. 
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Figure 3.5: The returns distribution for different values of 6. (Following [1].) 
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3.4 Democratic and Dictatorship Self-Organized 
M o d e l 
D'Hulst and Rodgers proposed the following variation on the EZ model [27 . 
Initially, every agent is given a random number pi, for 0 < p < 1. All agents 
having the same value of Pi are taken to belong to the same cluster. The 
parameter pi represents the character of the agent, e.g. her opinion of the 
market, etc. At each time step, two agents i and j are selected randomly. 
With probability aij : \pi — Pj\, called the fragmentation rate, all the agents 
in the cluster consisting of agent i make a transaction in the same way as in 
the EZ model. After buying or selling, the cluster is broken up into isolated 
agents and each agent takes up a new value of p selected randomly from the 
range [p — r, p + r], where r is a constant. For small r, agents are more likely 
to have a closer p value with the agents belonging to the previous cluster, 
thus representing a remembrance of agents' previous action. With probability 
1 — ciij, all the agents in the cluster of agent i and that of agent j merge 
together with all agents taking on the same p value, pij, after the combination. 
If pij 二 Pi, it is called the dictatorship model. If pij = {pi + Pj)/2, it is called 
the democratic model� 
In the steady state, numerical simulations show that the distribution of the 
p values among the agents tend to peak at p 二 0 and p = 1 for the dictatorship 
model. The behaviour is similar to that observed in the evolutionary minority 
game [28]. The average fragmentation rate a is roughly equal to 0.5. Figure 3.6 
shows the distribution of p for the dictatorship model, with 7V=10000, r=0.1, 
and for a run of 10^  time steps. 
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Figure 3.6: The distribution of p for the dictatorship model. 7V=10000, r=0.1 
and for a run of 10^  time steps. 
For the democratic model, the distribution shows that the values of p among 
the agents tend to peak at p = 0.5. The average fragmentation rate a is nearly 
equal to 0. Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of p for the democratic model, 
with iV=10000, r=0.1 and for a run of 10^  time step. 
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Figure 3.7: The distribution of p for the democracy model. TV二 10000, r=0.1 
and for a run of 10^  time steps. 
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The cluster size distribution is given by Eqs.(3.6)-(3.12) by replacing a 
by a. In both the democratic and dictatorship models, Ug cx s-邓 and the 
probability density of returns P{R) oc R部.The numerical result of P(K) 
against R is shown in Figure 3.8. 
1 0 c 1 1 1 1 1—I—1~1~] 1 i 1 1 1—i—i~I 
slope=-1.5 
110-^ r 1 
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R 
Figure 3.8: P{R) as a function of R for the dictatorship and democratic models. 
The solid line shows a power law with exponent -3/2. 7V=10000, r=0‘l, and 
for a run of 10^  time steps. 
3.5 Effect of Size-Dependent Fragment at ion and 
Coagulation Probabilities 
A variation on democratic and dictatorship model has been proposed by Zheng, 
Rodgers, Hui and D'Hulst [2；. 
With the same modification as Section 3.3，Ug is given by Eq.(3.16). For 
the democratic model, a 0, then rig oc s—(暑—巧 and the probability density 
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of returns P{R) oc i ? —(臺F o r the dictatorship model, a ^ 0.5. Then ris ^ 
A石厂(鲁-J) and the probability density of returns P{R) oc B丑iT(鲁—% where A 
and B are constants. 
Moreover, the distribution of p also depends on 6 after introducing the 
size-dependent fragmentation and coagulation rate�For dictatorship model, 
distribution of p becomes flattened as 6 increases. The results are shown in 
Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of p with different values of 5 for the dictatorship 
model. (Following [2].) 
For the democratic model, the peak increases for 5 when 0 < < 1. 
However, the peak decreases for S when J � 1 . The results are shown in 
Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of p with different values of 6 for the democratic 
model. (Following [2].) 
3.6 Extensions of E Z model 
In this section, we propose a few extensions of the EZ model so that a cluster of 
agents may dissociate without buying or selling. The probability of this event 
is assumed to depend on the size s of that cluster. We consider the following 
three different cases. 
Model A [29]: At each time step, the cluster of the selected agent i has a 
probability 1-a to merge with another cluster. With probability a(l — s—"^a)， 
the cluster dissociates without buying or selling, where > 0 is a constant. 
Buying and selling happen with equal probability Therefore, the larger 
the cluster, the higher the probability it dissociates without making a trans-
action. For (7a = 0, the model reduces to the original EZ model. It can be 
interpreted as the more members a cluster has, the more difficult it is for the 
agents to reach the same decision. The cluster dissociates as a result of low 
efficiency. 
The cluster size distribution is given by Eqs.(3.6)-(3.12). Following Eq.(3.5), 
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the probability distribution of returns, P{R), becomes the probability of choos-
ing a cluster of size s times the probability of making a transaction. Therefore 
P{R)�P{s)s X ^ ^ � �i r ( 臺 ( 3 . 1 8 ) 
The numerical results of P{R) for different values of cr^  are shown in Figure 
3.11. The numerical results show that the returns distribution follows a power 
law with an exponent equals to l.S+a^, as stated in Eq.(3.18). 
K x X • “ ； 
•丨：丨 “ 
： s . o p e = - 3 . 0 \ 来 
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Figure 3.11: Log-log plot of the returns distribution, P{R), for cu二0, 0.5, 1.0 
and 1.5. N — 10000 and a=0.01 are used. The solid lines show the power laws 
with exponents equal to 3/2+(Ja 
Model B: At each time step, the cluster of the selected agent i merges 
with another cluster (of agent j) with a probability 1-a. With probability 
a 1 — (—Y^ for s < So, where as and s�are constants, and with probability 
\ So " — 
a 1 — for 5 > So, the cluster dissociates without buying and selling 
the stock. Here s�represents a typical cluster size. Buying and selling happen 
with equal probability K^)""^ for s < and probability for s > 
The cluster has a higher probability of carrying out a transaction when its 
size is close to s�. For the cluster size becomes much less than the agents 
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lack confidence to carry out a transaction. For cluster size larger than the 
agents may not be able to reach a decision. 
The cluster size distribution is given by Eqs.(3.6)-(3.12). The probability 
distribution of returns, P{R), becomes 
P{R)�P{s)s X 芸（！广B   R - i l - ^ B ) ^ for R<R, (3.19) 
Z So 
where R�corresponds to the return contributed by cluster of size So, and 
P{R)�P{s)s X  ( l + J B )  i r ( 臺 f o r R> Ro (3.20) •Z s 
Figure 3.12 shows the numerical results for the returns distribution for (7^=0.5 
and 1.5. 
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Figure 3.12: Returns distribution, P{R), for 二0.5 and 1.5, with N = 10000 
and a=0.01. The dashed lines show the power laws with exponents equal to 0 
and -3 for comparison. 
The returns distributions show a change of slope for the two values of as. 
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For gb 二 1.5, the dashed lines show the power laws with exponents equal to 
-1.5+cjb=0 and -1.5-crs=-3, as expected in Eq.(3.19) and (3.20). 
Model C: Using the high frequency data of S&P500 index, Gopikrishnan 
et al showed that the probability distribution of the returns shows different 
behaviour in different regions [10]. There is a crossover from one power law to 
another. In the central part of the distribution, the power law has an exponent 
equals to -2.7, which is Levy type (see Chapter 2). For large returns regime, 
the power law has an exponent equals to -4, which is beyond the Levy range. 
We try to reproduce this crossover behaviour in the EZ model by combining 
Model A and Model B. At each time step, the cluster of the selected agent i 
merges with another cluster (of agent j) with probability 1-a. With probability 
a 1 - 念 )〜 f o r s < So, and with probability a 1 - (⑶即 for 
s > So, the cluster dissociates without buying and selling the stock. Buying and 
selling happen with equal probability for s < Sq and probability 
for s > So. 
The cluster size distribution is given by Eqs.(3.6)-(3.12). The probability 
distribution of returns, P(R), becomes 
2 Sq 
〜 厂 ( 1 + … ( 3 . 2 1 ) 
�i r ( § + " — f o r R < R o 
and 
Za S 
� ( 3 . 2 2 ) 
〜 丑 — f o r R > Ro 
Figure 3.13 shows the numerical results of returns distribution for a]=1.85 
and {7^—0.65. 
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Figure 3.13: Returns distribution, P{R), for and with N 二 
10000 and a二0.01. The solid line shows a power laws with an exponent equals 
to -4 and the dashed line shows a power law with an exponent equals to -2.7. 
For small returns, the returns distribution is a power law with an exponent 
-2.7. For large returns, the returns distribution is a power law with an exponent 
-4. Both exponents can be tuned by parameters and cr .^ The position of 
the crossover can be tuned by So. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we reviewed the EZ model proposed by EguAuz and Zimmer-
man. The EZ model is proposed to study the link between herding behaviour 
and fat tail in returns distribution. In the EZ model, the agents group into 
clusters and they decide to buy or sell the stock with other agents in his group. 
The cluster size distribution is a power law with an exponent -5/2. The returns 
distribution is a power law with an exponent -3/2. 
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Some variations of the EZ model were also reviewed. Zheng, Hui and John-
son introduced a size-dependent dissociation rate. If a transaction is made, the 
cluster (of size s) dissociates with probability s^  and remains unchanged with 
probability If no transaction are made, two clusters of sizes Si and Sj 
merge with probability s f ^ s j � a n d the two clusters remain separated with 
probability 1 — s 「 办 I t is found that the cluster distribution shows a power 
law with exponent - ( | - c^ ), and the returns distribution shows a power law 
with exponent —(| — 6). The exponents can be tuned by the parameter 5. 
D'Hulst and Rodgers introduced the gene value p for each agent, where 
0 < p < 1. The gene value represents the character of the agent. If a group 
of agents have similar gene values, they will have a higher chance to make 
the same decision. Two models were studied. In the dictatorship model, one 
cluster copies the gene value of another cluster when they merge. It is found 
that the gene value distribution will tend to separate into two peaks at p = 0 
and p = 1. In the democratic model, the two clusters take on a new gene 
value equals to the mean of the gene values of the two clusters. It is found 
that the gene value distribution peaks at p = 0.5. In both models, the returns 
distribution shows a power law with an exponent -3/2. 
Zheng, Rodgers, Hui and D'Hulst introduced a size-dependent rate to the 
dictatorship and democratic models. For the dictatorship model, the distribu-
tion of p becomes flattened as S increases. For the democratic model, the peak 
increases with 5 when 0 < < 1, and decreases with 6 when S > 1. In both 
models, the returns distribution shows a power law with an exponent -(3/2-6). 
In order to study the crossover behaviour in the power law exponent ob-
served in S&P500 index, we proposed a model in which a cluster of agents may 
dissociate without making a transaction. The dissociation probability is size 
dependent. It is higher for larger clusters. With probability a 1 — 
for 5 < and with probability a 1 — for s > a cluster dis-
sociates without buying and selling. Buying and selling happen with equal 
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probability 着s—"(•；^ for s < s…and probability for s > So. 
Two clusters merge together with probability 1-a. The returns distribution is 
found to depend on the parameters a a, (Jb and s�. A crossover in the power 
law exponent from -2.7 for small returns to -4 for large returns is obtained for 
CT尸 1.85 and (JB=0.65. The position for the crossover can also be tuned by 
the parameter Sq. 
Chapter 4 
Review on the Minority 
Game(MG) 
Many biological, economical and financial problems can be understood as a 
population competing for a limited resource. One way to study the collective 
behaviour in a competing population is to set up a suitable toy model. In recent 
years, a popular model is the Minority Game (MG). The Minority Game is 
proposed by Challet and Zhang [4] as a generalization of Arthur's famous El 
Farol's bar problem [3]. In the MG, the agents are competing to be in the 
minority group. The behaviour exhibited in the MG are non-trivial and much 
work has been done on it [30]. In this Chapter, we review the model and 
some important results on the MG. In the next three chapters, we will propose 
different variations on the MG. 
4.1 T h e Model and Results 
The MG is played by N agents, where N is an odd number. At every time 
step, all agents should decide independently on attending one of the two rooms 
(choices), labeled '0' and '1'. Those who happened to be on the minority side 
win. 
The only information announced to the agents is the history. The history is 
42 
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a bit-string of length 771 recording the minority room for the last m time steps. 
For example, for m = 4, the bit-string '0101' represents the the minority 
room for the last 4 time steps, with the most recent outcome T on the right. 
Since there are only two rooms, each entry in the history bit-string should be 
either '0，or T . There are a total of possible histories for given m. The 
parameter m is the 'memory size' of the agents. For large m, the agents can 
analysis more information. In the MG, we assume all the agents have the same 
ability. Therefore, they all have the same value of m. 
An agent decides the room she attends by her strategies. Each agent picks 
s strategies randomly at the beginning of the game. A strategy is a look-
up table which contains the predictions of the minority room for all possible 
histories. Table 4.1 gives an example of a strategy for m 二 4. 
Table 4.1: An example of a strategy in the Minority Game. 
entry history prediction 
1 0000 1 
2 0001 0 
3 0010 0 
2 饥—1 1110 1 
nil 0 
The above strategy predicts the minority room to be room 1 for history '0000', 
room 0 for history '0001' and so on. The performance of a strategy is measured 
by its virtual points. The way to assign virtual points will be discussed in the 
next paragraph. Among the s strategies, the agent follows the prediction of 
the strategy with the highest virtual points. In case of two or more strategies 
having the same highest virtual points, the agent will randomly use one of these 
strategies. Since there are a total of 2饥 possible history bit-strings, the total 
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number of distinct strategies is The size of the strategy pool increases 
rapidly with m, and plays an important role in the phase transition in the MG. 
As the game proceeds, every agent follows the prediction of her best strat-
egy. The agents who have chosen the minority room are the winners in that 
time step. All the winners will be rewarded one real point. After each time 
step, every strategy which has predicted the minority room will gain one vir-
tual point, no matter the strategy has actually been used or not. Therefore, 
the virtual points recorded the performance of the strategies, in the sense that 
the strategy which predicted the minority room more frequently will have a 
higher virtual print. 
Through the mechanism of rewarding virtual points, the agents learn from 
past experiences and adjust their behaviour to adapt to the environment. The 
most important feature of the MG is that for suitable parameters, the agents 
are able to organize themselves to perform better than coin-tossing, i.e., better 
than making random decisions. Figure 4.1 shows the standard deviation a of 
the attendance in room 1 for s=2, N 二 101 and 301. Since all strategies 
are picked randomly, there is no difference between the room labeled '0，and 
'1'. For a large attendance fluctuation, i.e., large a, the averaged number of 
winners per turn is small, implying a waste of resource. For more efficient use 
of resources, a is smaller and the number of winners per turn is higher. 
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Figure 4.1: a as a function of m for MG. iV=101 and 301, s 二 2 are used. 
Data represent the results of 10 independent runs, with 100000 time steps in 
each run. 
Figure 41 shows that a is large for small m, and it decreases as m increases. 
There exists an optimum memory size rUo for which the cr is a minimum. In 
the figure, mo二5 for N 二 101 and mo=7 for N 二 301. For m > rrio, the a 
increases gradually and tends to the random walk limit in the large m limit. 
There are two different phases separated by a phase transition at rrio [31]. For 
m < TTio, it is called the efficient phase or the crowded phase. For m > rrio, 
it is called the inefficient phase or the better-than-random phase. The phase 
transition and the properties of the two phases will be discussed in the next 
section. Near rrio, although the agents decide their actions independently, they 
cooperate with the other agents and perform better than coin-tossing. 
Figure 4.2 shows the success rate of the agents for s—2, N — 101 and 301. 
The success rate is defined as the average number of real points gained per 
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agent per turn. It shows that the success rate of the agents is higher in the 
inefficient phase for both values of N. For increasing TV, the value of ruo shifts 
towards larger values. 
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Figure 4.2: The success rate as a function of m for M G . TV—101 and 301, s = 2 
are used. Data represent the results of 10 independent runs, with 100000 time 
steps in each run. The lines show the average over 10 runs。 
4.2 Crowd-anticrowd Theory and Phase Tran-
sition 
The existence of the two different phases and the phase transition at m。are 
closely related to the size of the strategy pool. In the strategy pool, there are 
a total of 22"" distinct strategies. However, most of them are not significantly 
different. For example, if two strategies are only different by 1 entry among 
their 2爪 entries, then their predictions will be identical most of the time. It can 
Chapter 4 Review on the Minority Game(MG) 47 
be shown that the number of significantly different strategies in the strategy 
pool is only 2 • 2饥[32]. The strategy pool consisting of these 2 • 2饥 significantly 
different strategies is called the reduced strategy space. Every strategy in 
the reduced strategy space has one anti-correlated strategy, i.e., one that all 
entries are different, and 2 . 2爪-2 uncorrelated strategies, i.e., those with half 
of the entries being different, in the pool. The reduced strategy space defines 
the geometrical structure of the game. Challet and Zhang showed that the 
results obtained by using the reduced strategy space are similar to the results 
obtained by using the full strategy space [32 . 
The phase transition occurs near 2.2爪/sN ~ 1, for fixed N and s. 2 • is 
the size of the reduced strategy space and sN is the total number of strategies 
picked by the agents in the game. This result gives a qualitative explanation 
for the phase transition: 
For 2 • 2爪 < sN, the strategy space is over-crowded. A strategy is picked 
by many agents. In each time step, there are many agents using the few 
strategies with high virtual points. Therefore, large crowds of agents making 
similar decision are formed. The agents in a crowd use the same strategy, and 
hence contributing a large a. 
For 2 • 2爪〉 s N , the strategy pool is too large that nearly all the strategies 
picked by the agents are uncorrelated to one another. Therefore, the agents 
behave as random coin-tossing in the large m limit. 
Using the idea that agents using the same strategy form a crowd, Johnson 
et al developed the Crowd-Anticrowd theory to explain the behaviour of <j 
for different values of m [33, 34]. In the reduced strategy space, the agents 
using one strategy will behave oppositely to the ones using the anti-correlated 
strategy. They form crowd and anti-crowd, and their contributions to a can-
cel. Assuming the crowds act independently (except its anti-crowd), then by 
random walk theory, a can be calculated. For small m, the size difference 
between every crowd and anti-crowd is large and hence the cancellation effect 
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is poor. For large m, the size difference between every crowd and anti-crowd is 
small and hence the cancellation effect is better. Readers are referred to Ref. 
33] for details. 
4.3 Market Efficiency 
There is another property related to the size of the strategy pool. It is the 
information left in the history. For a small strategy pool, if there exists a good 
strategy, then the predicted room of that strategy will become too crowded 
since many agents will be using that strategy at the same time. The strategy's 
prediction is then incorrect. Therefore, no strategy can out-perform the others. 
For a large strategy pool, there may exist some strategies that perform well. 
Since the strategy pool is too large, the agents may not be able to pick these 
strategies, i.e., these strategies may not be even played by any agent at all. N o 
crowds are formed and hence these strategies may keep on performing well. 
The existence of the good strategies can be detected by the probability of 
having an outcome of T for a given history. If the probability of having an 
outcome of '1' is higher (lower) than that of '0', the strategies predicting '1' 
('0，）will have a higher chance of winning. 
Savit et al explored the information left in the history [31]. Figure 4.3 shows 
the probability, F(l|history bit-string), of room 1 being the minority room for 
a given history bit-string for small strategy pool m < m。 T h e x-axis is the 
decimal representation of the history bit-string, e.g., the history bit-string '010' 
is represented by '2'. The figure shows that the probability of room 1 being 
the minority room is 0.5 for all the history bit-strings. The results imply that 
no strategy can out-perform the others and there is no information for the 
strategies to adapt. No matter which room the strategy predicts, it may win 
or lose with the same probability on the average. As stated, once there is infor-
mation left in the history bit-strings, the well performing strategies will make 
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the predicted room over-crowded. The strategies lose and the information is 
removed. This region is called the efficient phase, as information is removed 
efficiently. 
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Figure 4.3: The probability of room 1 being the minority room given a history 
bit-string of length m二3. 7V=101, s 二 2 are used. A outcome bit-string of 
100000 time steps is used for the analysis. The x-axis is the decimal represen-
tation of the history bit-string. 
Figure 4.4 shows the probability of room 1 being the minority room for 
a given history bit-string for large strategy pool m > rUo. The probabilities 
of room 1 being the minority room are not equals to 0.5 for all the history 
bit-strings. Therefore, there exists a good strategy in which its prediction has 
a higher chance to be correct. 
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Figure 4.4: The probability of room 1 being the minority room given a history 
bit-string of length m = 6 . TV二 101, s = 2 are used. A outcome bit-string of 
100000 time steps is used for the analysis. The x-axis is the decimal represen-
tation of the history bit-string. 
For m > mo, information is left in the history bit-strings for a long time since 
the strategy pool is too large for the agents to form crowds. This region is 
called the inefficient phase, as it is inefficient to remove the information left. 
In an ideal financial market, as stated in the efficient market hypothesis 
6], there is no information left in the history. In real markets, the information 
left in the data is removed in a short time (see Chapter 2) as in the efficient 
phase of the M G . 
Besides the features discussed, many other features in M G are explored. Li 
et al have studied the M G with different payoff functions, i.e., the virtual point 
given to winning strategies depends on the number of winners in a time [35 . 
They found that the general dependence of a on m for different payoff functions 
is basically the same as in the basic M G . Johnson et al studied a population of 
mixed m [36]. The agents may perform better than a population of single m. 
A connection between the M G and spin glass model gives an analytic solution 
to ruo [37, 38, 39]. Zheng and Wang have studied the doubly periodic feature 
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in the history bit-strings in the efficient phase [40]. A good review on M G can 
be found in Refs. [34, 41 . 
Chapter 5 
MG with biased strategy pool 
The Minority G a m e is a toy model to study the resource distribution in a 
competing population. A n important problem in the M G is to enhance the 
performance of the population as a whole, and hence to look into ways to 
suppress the standard deviation a. A smaller a indicates a smaller fluctuation 
and hence more efficient in resource distribution. Some variations of M G , for 
example T M G [42] and E M G [43], show a suppression of a in the crowded 
phase. In this Chapter, we introduce a model based on the M G , with a biased 
strategy pool. It is found that introducing a bias in the strategy pool may 
enhance the winning probability for the population in the crowded phase 
44:. 
In the M G , the strategies in the whole strategy space on the average have 
equal numbers of O's and I's. W e propose a biased version of M G in which the 
agents are more willing to choose an option, say '1，. In the real world, it is not 
surprising that one of the options is more popular. It may be more realistic 
that the two options are not in the same position in competition. Within the 
M G , this tendency can be modeled by a strategy pool in which strategies with 
more I's than O's in their entries are more likely to be picked. 
52 
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5.1 T h e M o d e l 
W e define a parameter p describing this tendency as follows. Let Si be the 
s-th strategy picked by agent i. The strategy Si is a bit-string of length 
i.e., Si = .. ,a二)，where <，‘（a二，么 二0 or 1) is the prediction of the 
minority side when the ^-th (p 二 1,... , 2'^) history bit-string appears. The 
bias probability p is defined as: 
N S 2爪 
i—l Si=l fi—1 
which gives the probability of finding an entry 1 among all the strategies picked 
by the agents. Note that the case p 二 0.5 corresponds to the basic M G . In the 
present work, we bias the strategies so that there are more I's than 0，s in the 
strategies being drawn and study the situation with p > 0.5, which means the 
agents are more willing to go to room 1. 
To set up the game with p=Po / 0.5, the probability of picking a strategy 
with n I's and (2饥—n) O's is taken to be — po)，—几.As the choices of 
0 and 1 are symmetrical, it is sufficient to study our model with p > 0.5 (or 
p < 0.5)。Once the initial distribution of strategies is completed, the game 
proceeds according to the rules in the basic M G , as described in Chapter 4. 
5.2 Numerical Results and Discussion 
W e have performed detailed numerical simulations for p > 0.5. Several in-
teresting features are found. Figure 5.1 shows the standard deviation in the 
attendance in room 1 (or room 0) a as a function of m foi p = 0.50, 0.57 and 
0.62. 
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Figure 5.1: a as a function of m for different values of bias p = 0.50, 0.57 and 
0.62. N = 301, s — 3 are used. Data represent an average over 100 runs, with 
100000 time steps in each run. 
Comparing with the basic M G (p = 0.50), the value of m ^ separating the 
efficient phase and the inefficient phase becomes smaller for increasing p. The 
minimum value of a decreases as p increases. For large m , a is higher for larger 
bias. 
To explore the efficiency of resource distribution, it is useful to investigate 
the average success rate, which is the average number of real points per agent 
per turn. Figure 5.2 shows the averaged success rate as a function of p in the 
efficient phase (m二2 and 3). 
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Figure 5.2: The averaged success rate of the agents as a function of bias p for 
m=2 and 3. N = 301, s = 3 are used. Data represent an average over 100 
runs, with 100000 time steps in each run. 
For small deviations from p二0.5, the success rate increases gradually from 
its value of the M G at p = 0.5 with p。A steep increase then follows for a range 
of larger bias. As seen in Figure 5.1, increasing in p will lead to a smaller ttv 
For fixed m , the steep increase can be understood as a transition from efficient 
phase to inefficient phase due to the decrease in r?v 
A lower a in small m implies a more efficient use of resources. In the efficient 
phase, Figure 5.1 shows a suppression of a with increasing p. Therefore, the 
success rate increases with p as shown in Figure 5.2. The effect of biasing the 
strategies pool is non-trivial. In the efficient phase, the large a in the basic 
MG is due to over-crowding in the strategy space [33]. The population forms 
large crowd and anti-crowd populations. The poor cancellation of the action 
of the crowds by the anti-crowds lead to a large a (see Chapter 4) • In a biased 
strategy pool, the size of the crowds using strategies with more O's is reduced 
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due to the bias towards room 1. O n the other hand, the crowds using strategies 
with more I's are enlarged. Ranking the strategies according to their virtual 
points, we find that the cancellation between the crowds is enhanced in some 
situations, but can also become worse in other situations. The suppression in 
(7 is then a result after averaging over all the situations. Detailed treatment 
in the cancellation effect of crowds and anti-crowds in different cases will be 
carried out in the next section. 
W e also studied the outcome bit-string. For a history string of '00010', say, 
the string can be represented by the decimal value ji of the binary bit-string. 
For example, '00010' corresponds to "=2. Figure 5.3 shows the frequency of 
occurrence of strings of 5-bits in a biased M G with m = 5 and TV二301. Note 
that m > 
m-5 
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Figure 5.3: Bit-string occurrence frequency for the biased pool M G . N = 
301, s 二 3，m = 5 (inset shows the results for m=3{< m。)）are used. Data 
represent an average over 100 runs, with 100000 time steps in each run. 
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The results show that the bit-string '00000' shows up most frequently. Bit-
strings with one 1 and four O's, corresponding to 2，4，8, 16, occur with 
similar probabilities. It turns out that bit-strings with the same number of I's 
occur with nearly the same probability, and the probability decreases as the 
number of I's increases. The inset shows the results for m=3(< rUo). In this 
case, history bit-strings of length m occur with the same probability, regardless 
of the number of I's in the strings. In the basic M G , all history bit-strings 
occur with the same probability, regardless the patterns of the bit-strings. 
Figure 5.4 shows the probability of an outcome of T for each of the possible 
history bit-strings of length m in a game of m—5. The probability of an out-
come of '1' is lower for a history bit-string with more I's. Some of the history 
bit-strings will not lead to an outcome of 1. The results show that information 
is left in the history bit-string [31]. The inset shows the corresponding results 
for m = 3 ( < rUo). In this case, the probabilities for a 1 to follow each of the pos-
sible of history bit-strings are identical. In the basic M G , there is information 
left in the inefficient phase and no information is left for the agents to explore 
m-bit history bit-strings in the efficient phase, as discussed in Chapter 4. The 
information left is independent of the patterns of the history bit-strings in the 
basic M G (see Figure 4.4). Biasing the pool make the information stored in 
the inefficient phase to occur with a regular pattern, i.e., the history bit-string 
with more O's has a higher probability to outcome T . Although the insets in 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that the outcome of room 1 is equally probable as 
room 0 in the efficient phase, there is still some information left in the history 
bit-strings. The information is however, stored in longer history bit-strings as 
the double periodic phenomena [40] of the history bit-strings. 
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Figure 5.4: The probability of an outcome of T vs fi for the biased pool M G . 
N — 301, s 二 3,m 二 5 (inset shows the results for m二3(< rUo)) are used. 
Data represent an average over 100 runs, with 100000 time steps in each run. 
To further explore the performance of the agents, we numerically studied 
the number of agents who keep on using only one particular strategy, out 
of his s strategies, in playing the game. These are called frozen agents [37 . 
Figure 5.5 shows the number of frozen agents as a function of m for p=0.62. 
There is a sharp rise in the number of frozen agents at m = 4 , which coincides 
with the value of m at which a is a minimum and the success rate increases 
steeply. The inset of Figure 5.5 gives the results for the basic M G , for which 
the number of frozen agents is small and drops rapidly for m〉 m。 . It has 
been shown that the number of frozen agents decays exponentially with m for 
m > TTZo in the basic M G [37]. However for p=0.62, the number of frozen 
agents remain unchanged deep into the inefficient phase. The result can be 
interpreted as follows. In the inefficient phase, the strategy pool sufficiently is 
large to avoid too much overlap of strategies picked by the agents [32]. The 
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bias towards room 1 forces more agents to enter room 1 and hence enhances 
the winning of room 0 as showed in Figure 5.4. However, due to the bias, there 
is a smaller chance for strategies with more O's to be picked. Thus an increase 
in the virtual points for strategies with more O's may not lead to a large crowd 
towards room 0. As the game evolves, the feedback mechanism through the 
rewarding of virtual points forces one, which is usually the one with relatively 
more O's, of the s strategies of an agent to consistently perform well during 
the game. In this way, a large fraction of the agents become frozen. 
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Figure 5.5: The number of frozen agents as a function of m for a fixed bias of 
p — 0.62. N — 301, 5 = 3 are used. Data represent an average over 100 runs, 
with 100000 time steps in each run. The solid lines are results averaged over 
100 independent runs. The symbols are results for individual runs. The inset 
gives results for p = 0.50, i.e., the basic M G . 
As the frozen agents are those who hold a well performing strategy, it is 
expected that their success rate be higher. Figure 5.6 shows the success rates 
of the frozen agents and the unfrozen agents obtained numerically for a fixed 
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bias of p=0.62. It is noted that the averaged success rate of the frozen agents 
are indeed much higher than that of the unfrozen agents for all values of m. 
The features observed in Figure 5.5 and 5.6 also provide an explanation of the 
shift in irio as p increases. At m。，there is a large number of frozen agents and 
they have a higher success rate. It implies that the frozen agents should spread 
themselves rather evenly between the two rooms, otherwise most of them will 
lose. With the frozen agents due to the bias, the biased game actually behaves 
as a basic M G with fewer, unfrozen agents. Thus, the minimum in a occurs 
at a smaller rUo for a M G with bias, as observed in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.6: The success rate of the frozen and unfrozen agents, together with 
the overall success rate, as a function of m for p = 0.62. TV = 301, s = 3 are 
used. Data represent an average over 100 runs, with 100000 time steps in each 
run. 
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5.3 Theory: M G with Biased Strategy Pool 
In this section, we carry out an analysis for the M G with biased strategy pool. 
Denoting the number of agents in room 0 at time t as no(t) and that in room 
1 as rii {t). The difference in the number of agents in the two rooms at time t 
is 
D{t) = ni{t) - no{t). (5.2) 
The fluctuation of D{t) is measured by its standard deviation ajj, i.e.: 
al =< (B(t)- < D(t) >)2 > . (5.3) 
Note that gd is related to a, the standard deviation of the attendance in room 
l,by: 
4 二< 剛 - < D(t)〉)2 > 
=< D{tY >-< D{t)〉2 
=< (ni(t) 一 no(t))2 > - < ni{t) — no{t) 
。 o (5.4) 
=< (2ni⑴一AO > -(2 < ni(t) > —Nf 
二 4 < TLiitf > - 4 < ni{t)〉2 
二 4cr2. 
W e now consider the simplest case of m 二 1 and N = 1001, s = 2. For 
m = 1, there are only two possible histories, either history bit-string '0' or 
history bit-string T . Therefore, each strategy only has two entries. W e denote 
a strategy as {A, B), representing a strategy that predicts room A for history 
bit-string '0' and room B for history bit-string '1，. There are totally four 
strategies in the strategy pool: (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1). At each time 
step, these four strategies can be ranked according to their virtual points. The 
ranking of virtual points is important because an agent uses her strategy with 
the highest virtual points. In case of holding two strategies with equal virtual 
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points, the agent randomly chooses one strategy. Therefore, the agents make 
discussion according to the virtual points. Given the patterns of ranking in 
virtual points, we can work out the attendance in the rooms statistically. 
W e represent the ranking of the four strategies by [a, b, c, d], corresponding 
to the ranking of (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1) respectively. A lower ranking 
represents a higher virtual point. Strategies with the same virtual points have 
the same ranking. For example, [1,2,2,3] represents that strategy (0,0) has 
the highest virtual points. Strategies (0,1) and (1，0) have the same virtual 
points, which is less than that of (0,0). Strategy (1,1) has the lowest virtual 
points. 
The probability of virtual points ranking is found by numerical simulations. 
For N = 1001, s = 2,m = 1 and p > 0.55, the ranking is shown in Table 5.1. 
At every time step, the ranking patterns occur with certain probability. 
Table 5.1: List of ranking of the strategies and their probability for N 二 
1001, s = 2, m 二 1 and p 2 0.55 
Ranking [1,1,1,1] [1,2,2,3] [1,2,1,2] 
probability 0.25 0.25 0.5 
For p < 0.55, there are more patterns for the virtual points ranking. The 
analysis on p < 0.55 can be carried out in the same way as the following 
analysis, although it is needed to consider more different ranking patterns. 
Here, we only show the case for p > 0.55. 
In the following analysis, we aim to calculate and compare with nu-
merical results. For the i-th virtual points ranking pattern occurring with 
probability Pi, the standard deviation of (only) that pattern is denoted by o m 
and the difference in the number of agents is denoted by A⑷ . c t d is related 
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to (jDi and A ⑴ by: 
4 = < < m >)2 > 
=< D(t)' >-< D{t)〉2 
A ' > ) — iT^Pj < D, < D , > ) 
i j k 
= < D ^ >) — [ ( ^ / f < A >2) + (JJPjPk < 巧 X Dk >)] 
i i j^k 
= E 巧 + E P 办 — 只 汁 < A >2) — Y^明 < A X Dj >, 
i i i柏 
(5.5) 
where cr^)- =< {Di{t)— < Di{t) >. Therefore, for each virtual points 
ranking pattern, we need to calculate a^i and < A ⑷ >. 
Consider the case of [1,2,2,3], we assume the history bit-string is '0'. It 
makes no difference if we consider the history bit-string to be ‘1，. In this 
case, the agents holding two (0,0)，one (0,0) and one (1,1), one (0,0) and 
one (1,0), one (0,0) and one (0,1), two (0,1), or one (0,1) and one (1,1) will 
attend room 0 according to their strategies. In this way, we can compute the 
average number of agents attending room 0. Since each strategy's entry is 
assigned '1' with probability p or '0' with probability 1 — p, the number of 
agents holding two (0, 0) is N(l—p)^. With similar arguments for the number 
of agents holding a particular pair of strategies, we can finally evaluate the 
number of agents attending room 0 to be 
number of agents attending room 0 
(5.6) 
二 N[2p^(l -p)-h 3p^(l - pf + 4p{l 一 pf + (1 — pf. 
Similarly the agents holding two (1,1), one (1,1) and one (1,0)，or two (1,1) 
will attend room 1. The number of agents attending room 1 is then given by 
number of agents attending room 1 
(5.7) 
二 + 2/(1 pf \. 
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For those holding one (0，1) and (1,0), they will attend either room 0 or room 
1 with equal probability since the two strategies have the same virtual points 
and predict different rooms. The number of these coin-tossing agents is 
number of coin-tossing agents 二 N[2p^{l — p^)]. (5.8) 
To calculate cjDi for the virtual points ranking pattern concerned, note that 
only the coin-tossing agents contribute to ooi since the actions of the other 
agents (see Eqs.(5.6) and (5.7)) are deterministic and there is no fluctuation. 
The standard deviation of a coin-tossing problem is, 
a = y i , (5.9) 
where n is number of tosses. The coin-tossing agents contribute to am as given 
by Eq。(5.9) with n being the number of coin-tossing agents. Putting Eq.(5.8) 
and Eq.(5.9) into Eq.(5.4), we have: 
2 .^N[2p\l-pf] 
(Jm = 4 X  
4 (5.10) 
二 2 7 V ( 1 — 
To calculate < Di{t)〉，only the deterministic agents contribute since the 
coin-tossing agents, in average, distribute themselves evenly in the two rooms. 
Putting Eq。(5.6) and Eq.(5.7) into Eq.(5.2), we have: 
< A⑴ > = + 2p\l-p)+ /(I - pf]-
N[2p\l-p) + 3/(1 - pf + 4p(l — pf + (1 — pY] (5.11) 
= N [ p ' — 2 / ( 1 一 pf—4p(i - pf - (1 - p n 
The above analysis can be carried out for other virtual points ranking 
patterns. For [1,1,1,1], we have 
al, = 2N[p\l-p) + 2p\l - pf + p(l — p)% (5.12) 
and 
< A W > = N[p' + 2/(1 -p)- 2p{l - pf — (1 — p)% (5.13) 
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For [1,2,1,2], the results for history bit-string '0' are different from that 
of history bit-string '1，. These cases appear with equal probability and we 
consider these cases separately. For history bit-string ‘0，： 
c^m = 2N[p\l-p) 1 ) 3 ] , (5.14) 
and 
< Diit) > = iV[p4 + 2/(1 —p) — 2p(l — pf - (1 - p)% (5.15) 
For history bit-string T : 
二 0, (5.16) 
and 
< Di(t)〉二 — 4/(1 — pf - 4p(l — pY — (1 — p)% (5.17) 
Finally putting Eqs.(5.10)-(5。17) into Eq.(5.5) with Pi given in Table (5.1), a^ 
becomes 
/V2 
- ^ [ 3 / — 28/(1 — pf - 72p'(l 一 pf — 70p\l — p)4 
+ 24/(1 — p f + 50/(1 p)6 + 24p(l - p Y + 3(1 — 
Figure 5.7 shows the results obtained by our analysis. Comparing with 
simulation results, our calculated aj^ agree well with numerical results. For 
increasing p, a^, decreases. 
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Figure 5.7: ao as a function of p for the biased pool M G . N — 1001, s — 2 and 
m 二 1 are used. Data represent an average over 50 runs, with 100000 time 
steps in each run. The solid lines are results averaged over 50 independent 
runs. 
W e can also calculate the success rate of the agents. The success rate is 
defined as the real points gained per agent per turn. A higher success rate 
implies more winning agents per turn. The success rate is given by 
P N — < DAt) > 
success rate = ^ ^ . (5.19) 
i 
where < A ⑴ > is given by Eqs.(5.11), (5.13), (5.15) and (5.17). Figure 5.8 
shows the calculated success rate together with numerical results for compar-
ison. For increasing p, the success rate increases. Indicate a more efficient 
resource distribution. Introducing a bias in the strategy pool can improve the 
averaged performance of the agents. The analysis agrees with the numerical 
results. 
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Figure 5.8: Success rate as a function of p for the biased pool M G . N 二 1001, 
s 二 2 and m 二 1 are used. Data represent an average over 50 runs, with 
100000 time steps in each run. The solid lines are results averaged over 50 
independent runs. 
As discussed in Section 5.2, the suppression of a is due to the cancellation 
between the crowds and anti-crowds in some situations. Figure 5.9 shows 
the absolute value of < A ⑴ > as a function of p for different cases in our 
calculation. As shown in the figure, for the cases [1,2,2,3] and [1,2,1,2] with 
history T’ | < A ⑴ > | decrease as p increases, implying the difference in 
the sizes of the crowds and anti-crowds is reduced. For the other two cases, 
< Di{t) > I increases as p increases, implying that the difference in the sizes 
of the crowds and anti-crowds is enhanced. The reduction turns out to be 
larger than the enhancement, and the overall a is suppressed. 
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Figure 5.9: | < Di{t) > | as a function of p for different cases in our calculation. 
In Table 5.1, we found the probability of virtual points ranking by numerical 
simulations. In the following, we are going to explain the occurrence of the 
virtual points ranking pattern. Consider m 二 1 and s = 2, at a certain time 
step, the virtual points ranking is [1,1,1,1] and the history is '1'. From Eq. 
(5.13), we have〈AW〉> For a large enough p, e.g. p > 0.55, the number 
of coin-tossing agents is small (Eq.(5.12)) so that the fluctuation of the coin-
tossing agents will not affect the outcome. Therefore, ni{t) > no(t) and room 
0 wins. The strategies (0,0) and (1,0) are rewarded one virtual point. In the 
next time step, the ranking becomes [1,2,1,2] and the history is '0'. Applying 
the above analysis, we found that the outcome is '0' and the ranking becomes 
1,2,2,3] in the next time step. Carry out the analysis for a few time steps, the 
situation reduces to [1,1,1,1] and history T . Then the whole process repeat 
itself. In Figure 5.10, we summarized the flow of the virtual points ranking and 
the corresponding history. It shows that the time series of the virtual points 
Chapter 5 MG with biased strategy pool 69 
ranking shifts among four different situations. The analysis is consistent with 
the numerical results in Table 5.1. 
Ranking [1,1,1,1] 
； v ^ 
room 1 wins/ ~ \ room 0 wins 
Ranking[2,1,2,1] / history 1 \ / history 0 \ Ranking [1,2,1,2] 
\ /。. 
room 1 wins \ / room 0 wins 
/ history 0 \ 
Ranking [1,2,2,3] 
Figure 5.10: The flow of the virtual points ranking and the corresponding 
history for m = 1, s = 2 and p > 0.55. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we introduced a biased-pool M G to simulate competitions in 
unequal situations. In this variation, the probability of the occurrence of a T 
in a strategy is different from that of a '0'. The probability of assigning a '1' 
is controlled by a parameter p, where p > 0.5. After assigning the strategies 
to the agents, the game is played as in the basic M G . 
The most important feature we found for p > 0.50 is that in the crowded 
phase, the standard deviation a is suppressed. The result indicates an increase 
in the averaged success rate of the agents and thus a more efficient resources 
distribution. It is due to the overall suppression of the size of the largest 
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crowd. W e have performed calculations on CTD, the standard deviation of the 
difference in attendance in Sec 5.3, and the analytic results are found to agree 
with numerical results. Furthermore, the optimum memory size m。, where a 
shows a minimum, becomes smaller for increasing p. 
W e also investigated the information stored in the history bit-strings. For 
m < rUo, all the history bit-strings of length m occur with equal probability. 
The only information left in the history bit-strings is stored in longer bit-strings 
reflected by the double periodic phenomena. Thus, it is the same as in the 
basic M G . For m > m。, history bit-strings with more O's occur with higher 
probabilities, and they have higher probabilities to lead to a '1' outcome. Thus 
there is information left in the history bit-strings and the information is well 
ordered. Consider an outsider whose action does not affect the outcome. He 
can win the game by properly exploring the information. In the basic M G , 
there is also information left but there is no regular pattern [31 . 
W e have also explored the frozen agents. In the basic M G , the frozen 
agents occur only near TTV The number of frozen agents is small and decays 
exponentially with increasing m. However for p〉0.5, there are more frozen 
agents at rrio and the number remains unchanged as m increases. The frozen 
agents perform better than the other agents and they have a higher success 
rate. The importance of the frozen agents is that they spread themselves 
evenly between the two rooms。The game can then be treated as a basic M G 
with fewer agents。This leads to the shift of rUo to smaller m , as observed in 
numerical data. 
Chapter 6 
MG with Randomly 
Participating Agents 
In the previous chapter, we have introduced the M G with a biased strategy 
pool. It was found that the standard deviation in the number of agents making 
a particular choice a is suppressed in the small m region. In this Chapter [45], 
we propose a new variation in M G in which one or a few agents are allowed 
to join the game with probability q. The aim is to search for ways in which 
the agents and the population as a whole can perform better, when compared 
with the basic M G L It turns out that these randomly participating agents have 
winning probabilities that are significantly enhanced over the rest of the agents 
who enter the M G every turn. Detailed results of numerical simulations of our 
model are reported and a theoretical explanation is proposed. 
6-1 T h e Model with O n e R P A 
Consider the M G with N competing agents. Among these agents, one ran-
domly participating agent (RPA) is allowed to join the game in each turn with 
a probability q. With probability 1 — g, the agent does not join the game in 
each turn. The remaining N-1 agents join the game every turn, as in the basic 
M G . 
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W h e n the R P A joins the game, she plays the game in the same way as in the 
basic M G . Looking at the history bit-string of the last m turns no matter she 
has joined the game or not, she uses her best strategy, i.e., the strategy with 
the highest virtual points, to predict the minority room. After each turn that 
she plays, one virtual point is rewarded to the strategies that has predicted 
the minority room correctly. W h e n the R P A does not join the game, she just 
stays out of the game. No virtual point is rewarded to her strategies in the 
turns that she is absent. W h e n the two rooms have equal number of agents, 
the winning room is chosen randomly. W e remark that this tie situation in the 
attendance in the two rooms does not happen often. 
The difference between the present model and the basic M G is that one 
randomly participating agent is introduced. For q = 1, the R P A plays the 
game every turn, and the present model reduces to the basic M G . 
6.2 Results for q = 0.5 
In this section, we discuss the numerical results for the case of q = 0.5. The 
most important result is that the success rate of the R P A is found to be 
enhanced in the efficient phase. 
Figure 6.1 shows the success rate, R , of the R P A , together with that of the 
other agents as a function of m for N == 101, s=2 ( Figure 6.1(a) ) and 5=3 ( 
Figure 6.1(b) )• 
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Figure 6.1: The success rate, R, of the R P A and the other agents as a function 
of m ioY N = 101, q : — 0.5, and for (a)5 —  2, and {h)s = 3. 50 independent 
runs are carried out for each value of m. The lines represent an average over 
the result of 50 runs. 
From Figure 6.1，it is found that in the efficient phase, the success rate of the 
R P A is much higher than that of the other agents. The enhanced success rate 
of the R P A over the other agents is more pronounced for higher values of s. In 
the inefficient phase, the success rate the R P A drops below the other agents. 
In the large m limit, the success rate of the R P A becomes identical to that 
of the other agents. It is because in the limit of a large strategy pool, the 
strategies of all agents become uncorrelated and all the agents, including the 
R P A , decide by coin-tosses as discussed in chapter 4. 
To see how the success rate of the R P A changes, Fig. 6.2 shows the success 
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rate of the R P A as a function of m for three different systems: N 二 101 with 
s = 2 and for N = 301, s=2, 3. 
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Figure 6.2: The success rate, R, of the R P A as a function of m for three 
different systems: q = 0.5, N 二 101 with 5 = 2 and for N = 301, s二2, 3. Each 
data point represents an average over the results of 50 independent runs. 
In general, the success rate of the R P A depends weakly on m in the small m 
region. At the optimum memory size rUo, the success rate of the R P A drops to 
minimum. In the large m limit, the success rate of the R P A becomes identical 
to that of the other agents. 
The enhanced success rate of the R P A can be explained in the following 
way. It has been shown that in the efficient phase, the history bit-string 
exhibits a doubly periodic feature, i.e., the history bit-string stores features in 
its statistics with periodicity of length 2x2"" [40]. It is related to the length 
of the euclidean path that goes through all possible history once. W h e n a 
particular history bit string appears for the first time, the agents basically 
decide randomly. The virtual points are rewarded to the strategies which have 
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predicted the minority room. W h e n the particular history bit-strings appears 
for the second time, the agents using the strategies which are rewarded last 
time. However, the crowd effect in the efficient phase makes them become the 
losing agents. The minority room in the last occurrence becomes the majority 
room this time. For the next occurrence of the same history bit-string, the 
situation is similar to that of the first occurrence. Since there are a total of 
possible history bit-strings, it takes on average 2x2"^ time steps to sample all 
the history bit-strings twice, thus leading to the doubly-periodic features [40 . 
In our model, since no virtual points are rewarded to the RPA's strategies if 
she does not join the game, the accumulated virtual points of her strategies 
are different from that of the other agents. The ability to opt out of the 
game and not to reward the strategies in the turns of absence turns out to 
have the effects of avoiding the R P A from adapting to the doubly periodic 
feature created by the other agents. Therefore, the R P A avoids herself from 
the crowd effect, and has an enhanced success rate. W e have checked that 
if the R P A keeps recording the performance of her strategies for every turn 
including those in her absence, she will adapt to the global information and 
the crowd effect persists. In this case, no enhancement in the success rate is 
found. 
W e note that the effect of the R P A is different from a random agent. 
A random agent is an agent who participates with probability q and decides 
randomly once she joins the game. She does not adjust her behaviour according 
to the information. Figure 6.3 compares the success rates of a R P A and a 
random agent. The success rate of the R P A (solid line) is consistently higher 
than that of the random agent (dashed line) • Allowing the R P A to accumulate 
virtual points when she joins the game does lead to a better performance. 
Chapter 6 MG with Randomly Participating Agents 76 
0.6 I f I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
random agent 
X independent runs for a random agent 
0.55 - RPA -
o independent runs for a RPA 
B 0.5 - I I : • -
0.4 - I K o -
1 
- g -
0.35 ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 1 ‘ ‘ ‘ 
0 2 4 6 8 10 
m 
Figure 6.3: The success rate, R, as a function of m for two different versions 
of the game. The parameters are N 二 101, s 二 2 and q = 0.5，and 50 
independent runs are carried out for each value of m for each version. The 
solid line labeled R P A gives the average success rate of the R P A in the present 
model. The dashed line labeled random agent gives the average success rate 
of a random agent who joins and plays the game randomly. 
6.3 Inefficiency and Success Rate 
To explore deeper the underlying physics for the enhanced success rate of the 
R P A , we study the statistics of the bit-strings that the R P A used for recording 
her strategies. Since the success rate of the R P A is enhanced in the efficient 
phase, we only focus our discussion on the efficient phase, i.e., m < TTV In the 
efficient phase, the other agents behave as in the basic M G . Thus, there is no 
information for them to exploit. However, since the R P A only does not join 
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the game for all the turns, the outcome bit-string that she uses to update her 
strategies performance is different from that of the other agents. W e define 
the inefficiency e as follows: 
2爪 
^ = (6.1) 
where the sum is over the possible m-bit strings for given m and P(l|/x(m)) 
is the probability that a given m-bit string labeled by /i is followed by an 
outcome '1' in a long outcome bit-string in a particular run. The definition of 
5 is similar to 0 [37] or H [38, 39] in the spin glass model analysis of the M G . 
The inefficiency ^  is a measurement of the information stored in the bit-strings 
that the R P A uses. In the basic M G , no information is stored in the history 
and £=0 in the efficient phase. 
Figure 6.4 shows the probability distribution of e as seen by the R P A for 
TV二 101, m二2, 5=2 and q 二 0.5. The inset shows the probability distribution 
of e for m = 4 . It shows that ^  ^  0 for the R P A . The distribution shows a peak, 
with the peak increases with m. The R P A sees information in the histories. 
W e have checked that 5 = 0 for the other agents as in the basic M G . 
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Figure 6.4: The probability distribution of inefficiency s for 7V=101, m = 2 , 
s二2 and q -二 0.5. The inset shows the probability distribution of s for m = 4 . 
Each curve gives the results of 10000 independent runs. 
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As the R P A has a higher success rate than the other agents and has 
we explore the possible relationship between e and the success rate of the R P A . 
Figure 6.5 shows the success rate, R, of the R P A against e for a system with 
N = 101, s 二 2, m = 2 and q = 0.5. There are 10000 data points on the 
plot corresponding to 10000 independent runs. Each data point on the plot 
represents the success rate and the value of ^  in a realization of the game. 
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Figure 6.5: The success rate, R, against e of the R P A for a system with 
N 二 101, 5 = 2, m = 2 and q = 0.5. There are 10000 data points on the plot 
corresponding to 10000 independent runs. Note that the data points leads to 
the emergence of a line. The inset shows the results for a game with m = 4 in 
which the R P A holds two identical strategies. 
The data are scattered. For small e, the data points spread over a wider range. 
For each the upper bound of the success rate decreases as 5 increases. With 
the scattered data points, there emerges a straight line consisting of a fraction 
of 0.06 of the total number of runs. The slope of the line is -1, implying that 
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the success rate R takes on the form oi R = | - For m 二 2, there are 
total 2 ， = 16 different strategies. The probability of an agent picking two 
identical strategies is 16 x (去尸 二 0.0625. It is reasonable to propose that 
the emergence of a straight line in the data is due to the runs in which the 
R P A holds two identical strategies. The inset of Figure 6.5 shows the results 
for the game with m = 4 in which the R P A is restricted to hold two identical 
strategies. Nearly all the data points lie on a straight line. It shows that the 
straight line in Fig. 6.5 indeed comes from the runs with the R P A holding two 
identical strategies. 
Next, we explain the origin of the straight line. Consider a R P A holding 
two identical strategies for s 二 2 and she joins the game with probability q. For 
simplicity, we present our argument for m = 1. The argument can be readily 
generalized to larger values of m. The strategies have two entries for m = 1. 
Since the R P A holds two identical strategies, she makes a certain prediction, 
say '1', for a particular history bit-string. Let us focus on the history bit-
string of '0'. Recall that in the M G with small m , we have the feature of 
doubly periodicity. W e consider four different situations of the occurrence of 
a particular history '0' during the game: 
Case {A) : Consider the history '0，occurring for an odd number of times, 
say the (2/c+l)-th time, where k is the number of times that history '0' occurred 
before. The virtual points of the strategies among the agents do not reflect the 
cumulative performance due to the doubly periodic feature since the virtual 
points of many strategies are nearly the same (see the discussion on doubly 
periodic feature in Sec. 6.2). The outcome of this turn will then be random, 
say T . 
Case (B) : The next occurrence of history '0' following Case (A), i.e., the 
(2A:+2)-th time, the winning outcome will be '0' due to the virtual points given 
to the winning strategies in the (2A:+1)- th occurrence of the history. 
Case (C) : Consider the same history '0' occurring for the, say, (2A:'+l)-th 
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time, and in this case, the other N-1 agents are evenly split between the two 
possible decisions and that the R P A plays the game. In this case, the R P A 
always loses and the outcome will be '0，. 
Case {D) : For the next occurrence of the same history '0' following Case 
(C), the outcome will be '1' due to crowd effect as a result of the virtual points 
awarded in the {2k'-\-l)-th. time of occurrence of the history. In this case, if 
the R P A joins the game, she always wins. 
In the efficient phase, if the agents adapt to the doubly periodic feature, 
then the averaged success rate of the agents is much lower than 0.5 (see Figure 
4.2 in Chapter 4). However, the R P A is able to avoid herself from adapting 
to the doubly periodic feature by not looking at the outcomes in the turns 
that she does not play, then she would have a success rate nearly equals to 0.5 
when she joins the game and Case (C) or (D) do not happen. The R P A has 
a success rate of 0 for Case {C) and 1 for Case (D). 
Next we estimate the success rate R by counting Cases [A), (B), (C) and 
(D). Let N be the total number of turns that history ‘0，occurs, i.e., the total 
number of turns of Cases (A) and (B). The R P A participates in qN turns. 
Let Nc be the number of turns for Case (C) and the R P A plays. For these 
Nc turns, the R P A loses. It follows that there are also N。turns of Case {D). 
A m o n g these N^ turns of Case (D), the R P A plays in qN^ turns and wins 
with certainty. Other than the turns included in Cases (C) and (D), the R P A 
has a success rate of 0.5 for the other turns. The number of such turns is 
(^qN — Ne — qNc)- Putting the results together, the success rate of the R P A is 
^ {qN - N , - qN,) - O.b + N , • 0 + qN, - 1 R 二 ^  
qN (6.2) 
- 2 ) N . 
Next we would like to see how the inefficiency & defined in Eq.(6.1) is 
related to the success rate R. Consider the probability of an outcome of '1' 
following the particular history bit-string '0'. For the {qN - Nc - qNc) turns, 
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the probability of an outcome of '1' is 0.5 due to the doubly periodic feature. 
For the Nc turn of Case (C), the probability is zero. For the qNc turns of Case 
(D), the probability is 1. Thus the probability of an outcome '1' following a 
history bit-string of '0' is 
… f . … ( g T V — iVe —讽）.0.5 + T V 0 + q N , • 1 
probability o士 an outcome 1 = — 
- 2 2\q V N' 
(6.3) 
Putting Eq.(6.3) into Eq.(6.1), we have 
2 乙 2\q J N 
"=1,2 (6.4) 
1 / 1 
—— ——I  
“2\q ) 
where the summation over (i is sum over the possible history bit-strings. There 
are total 2爪 possible history bit-strings for memory size m (see Chapter 4). 
For m = l , there are two possible history bit-strings, '0' and '1'. Therefore the 
summation of /i is sum from 1 to 2爪=2 and we consider the Cases (2)，(B), 
(C) and (D) for each history. 
Putting Eqs. (6.2) and (6.4) together, we finally arrive at 
去一已， (6.5) 
which is independent of q. The result can be readily generalized to arbitrary 
m for m < mo. Obviously the argument holds for any one of the 2讯 history 
bit-strings. The sum over all history bit-strings and the normalization factor 
1/(2爪）in the defination of e (see Eq. (6.1)) cancels out and Eq. (6.5) remains 
valid. 
From Eq. 
(6.5), R is related to e through a straight line with slope -1 and 
y-intercept equals to 0.5, in agreement with numerical results in Figure 6.5. 
From Eq. (6.4), we can see that e depends on N�. For large N�, e is large. 
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However, in Case (C), the R P A should lose. Therefore, a large e implies Case 
(C) occurs more frequently and thus the R P A has a small success rate. 
6.4 Results for q + 0.5 
In this section, we study the effect of g / 0.5. Figure 6.6 shows the results 
of the average success rate of the R P A as a function of m for a system with 
TV二 101, s=2 for different values of participation probability q. For q=l, the 
success rate of the R P A is identical to that of the other agents and the results 
are identical to the M G . 
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Figure 6.6: The averaged success rate of the R P A as a function of m for a 
system with iV 二 101, s 二 2 for different values of participation probability 
q 二0.3，0.5, 0.8 and 1. 50 independent runs are carried out for each value of 
q and m. The symbols represent an average over the 50 runs. The lines are 
guide to eye. 
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In the efficient phase, the enhanced success rate for g / 1 takes on similar 
values, all of which are significantly higher than that of the other agents. It 
is because the R P A can prevent adapting to the outcome series that all other 
agents see for all q < 1. In the inefficient phase, the success rate is lower than 
that of the other agents. In the large m limit, the success rate of the R P A and 
the other agents become identical. 
Equation (6.5) is valid for q < 1. Figure 6.6 shows the success rate as a 
function of e with N = 101, s = 2, m = 2 for different values of q, with the 
R P A holding two identical strategies. 
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Figure 6.7: The success rate against ^  with N = 101, 5 = 2, m = 2 for g =0.3, 
0.4, 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7. 500 independent runs are carried out for each value 
of q. The R P A holds two identical strategies. The solid line represents the 
relationship R = \ — e (Eq.(6.5)). A total of 2500 data points are shown. 
The figure shows the data for different values of q collapsing onto a line. The 
solid line represents a straight line with slope=-l. The data clearly cluster 
around the solid line, and follow the relationship = | — ^  as in Eq. (6.5). 
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In Figure 6.6, the enhanced success rates are apparent for g 1 and the 
corresponding values for small m do not depend sensitively on q, and R drops 
only slightly with q. It is interesting to look at the distribution of e for values 
of q away from g = 1. Figure 6.8 shows the distribution of £ for four different 
values of q for a system with N — 101, 5 = 2 and m 二 2 for all agents. As 
q takes on values gradually away from unity, the distribution of inefficiency 
gradually spreads wider with the most probable value of e increases as the 
deviation of q from unity increases. In the basic M G (q=l), the distribution 
peaks at 5 = 0 and has no spreading. Therefore, in the efficient phase, an 
enhanced success rate is accompanied by an non-vanishing s. As R = | — ^  
(see Eq. (6.5)), the success rate of the R P A decreases with the most probable 
value of e increases for increasing q. The increase in e is small, therefore the 
decrease of success rate is small as shown in Fig. 6.6. 
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Figure 6.8: The distribution of e for the R P A in a system with N = 101, 5 = 2, 
m 二 2 for different values of q =0=3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. 1000 independent runs 
are carried out for each value of q. 
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6 . 5 M a n y R P A s 
In this section, we explore the success rate for Nrpa RPAS playing in the game 
where Nrpa > 1. Figure 6.9 shows the averaged success rate as a function of 
the fraction, Nrpa/N of R P A s in the population for a system with N 二 101， 
5 = 2, m = 2 and q =0.5. 
0.5 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 ‘ 
一 V . 产 乂 . 广 、 . . Z : 二〜…A：： 二 〜 二 I ^ 
nz。 /A 
0.48 - \、.〈、 1 f ^  
._ . 會 
① 0 46 - other agents (with RPAs) n -
2 ——RPAs / / 
w Q 。Other agents (with random agents) I j 
0 random agents f r 
8 0.44 - p J -
0-42 - J ^ -
0 4 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 ‘ ‘ ‘ 1 ‘ 
• 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
N嫩/N or N— J N 
Figure 6.9: The averaged success rate as a function of the ratio of R P A s in 
the population for a system with TV = 101，s 二 2’ m = 2 and q =0.5. A 
pair of lines show the success rate of the R P A s (dashed line) and the other 
agents (solid lines). For comparison, another pair of lines show the success 
rate of random agents (dot-dashed line) and the other agents (solid line with 
symbols). 50 independent runs are averaged over for each data point. 
The dashed line gives the success rate of the RPAs and the solid line gives 
the success rate of the other agents. It is surprising that for a wide range of 
Nrpa/N, the success rate of the RPAs and the other agents remain unchanged. 
In this region, the success rate of the RPAs is much higher than that of the 
other agents. The RPAs obtain a higher success rate by preventing themselves 
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from joining the crowds created by the other agents. It shows that the game 
is dominated by the crowd effect of the other agents until Nrpa/N ^ 0.6. For 
Nrpa/N > 0.6, the success rate of the R P A s decreases and that of the other 
agents increases with Nrpa/N. For Nrpa/N > 0.9, the success rate of the 
other agents becomes higher than that of the RPAs. In Fig. 6.9, the success 
rate of random agents (see section 6.2) and the other agents are shown for 
comparison, where Nrandom is the number of the random agents in the game. 
The dot-dashed line gives the success rate of the random agents and the solid 
line with symbols gives that of the other agents. As shown in Fig. 6.3, the 
success rate of the R P A s is consistently higher than that of the random agents 
for all m. It shows that the R P A s perform better than random agents for all 
ratio in the population. The scheme of rewarding virtual points to the R P A s 
leads to a better performance than deciding randomly. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have considered the effects of putting one random partic-
ipation agent (RPA) into the M G . The R P A is allowed to join the game with 
a probability q in each turn. The remaining agents join the game every turn, 
just as in the basic M G . The R P A sees the same history as the other agents 
in making prediction when she decides to join in a turn. For g 二 1, our model 
reduces to the basic M G . 
W e first consider q = 0.5. Numerical results show that in the efficient phase 
(m < TUo), the success rate of the R P A is much higher than the other agents. 
In the inefficient phase, the success rate of the R P A is slightly lower than 
the other agents. In the larger m limit, the success rates become identical. 
The enhanced success rate of the R P A in the efficient phase is a result of the 
virtual points rewarding scheme of the R P A . The R P A does not reward virtual 
points to her strategies in the turns that she does not join the game. This has 
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the effect of preventing her from joining the crowds, which in turn is a result 
of the doubly periodic feature produced by the rest of the population. The 
performance of the R P A is also found to be consistently better than an agent 
who decides to join and play randomly (see Figure 6.3), showing that the way 
in which virtual points are rewarded does lead to a better performance. 
W e then explored the information as seen by the R P A in the efficient phase. 
W e defined an inefficiency e in Eq. (6.1). e measures the information stored in 
the bit-strings as seen by the agents. In the basic M G , the agents see 5 = 0 [31 . 
For the R P A , The distribution oie shows a peak as shown in Fig. 6.4. In 
the plot of success rate against the corresponding £ for many independent runs, 
we found that the upper bound of the success rate decreases as e decreases. 
With the scattered data points, there emerges a straight line with slope -1. W e 
found that the straight line is contributed by the runs in which the R P A holds 
identical strategies. W e carried out an analytic calculation and showed that 
the success rate is related to ^  by a straight line with slope -1, in agreement 
with numerical results. 
For all values of g < 1 in the efficient phase, an enhancement of success rate 
in the efficient phase is found. Our results show that for all q < 1, the R P A 
can prevent herself from adapting to the doubly periodic feature produced by 
the actions of the other agents. 
Finally, we reported the numerical results for Nrpa > 1, where Nrpa is 
the number of R P A s in the game, we found that the enhancement in the suc-
cess rate persists up to a high concentration of R P A s of Nrpa/N 记 0.6. For 
N r p a / N > 0.6, the success rate of the R P A s decreases and that of the other 
agents increases. For Nrpa/N > 0.9, the success rate of the other agents 
becomes higher than that of the RPAs. Comparing with the performance of 
a similar fraction of random agents in the game (see Section 6.2), the per-
formance of the R P A s is consistently better than the random agents for all 
concentrations. 
Chapter 7 
A Model on Coupled Minority 
Games 
In the basic M G , all the agents try to predict the minority side between two 
options. In real situations, one does not always compete only in one repeated 
games, but several Taking an example in financial markets, one may partic-
ipate in the stock market and money market. Here we study a situation in 
which two games are played by a population of agents. 
Chow and Chau considered the multiple choice minority game ( M C M G ) 
46]. In the M C M G , N agents choose among Nc choices following the proce-
dures of the M G . The outcome with the least number of agents (among the 
Nc choices) is the winning outcome. Virtual points are rewarded to the strate-
gies that have predicted the minority side. It was found that the standard 
deviation of the attendance in the M C M G behaves similarly as that in M G . 
Foldy et al [47] studied the coupled M G consisting of N丨 M G s . In each 
M G , there are N agents playing their own local M G . There are two levels in 
this version of the minority game. In the local level, agents play their own local 
M G and compete to be in the minority side. In the global level, the N' M G s 
are considered to be the individual agents competing to be in the minority side. 
The information announced to the agents is the minority choices in the local 
and global levels. The information is reflected on the strategy rewarding rules. 
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The strategies predicted the minority side in their local M G are rewarded C 
virtual points and all the strategies in the minority M G s in the global level are 
rewarded one virtual point. It was shown that the average standard deviation 
of attendance (over the local M G s ) is larger comparing with the basic M G , 
i.e., the agents perform worse than the basic M G . For the cases of strong local 
level correlation, i.e., C = 1》0，the standard deviation of attendance exhibits 
global behaviour which depend on the value of N'. 
In this Chapter, we introduce a model of coupled minority games in which 
two M G s are played at the same time by one population of agents and the 
agents are allowed to shift between the two M G s . The success rate of the 
agents is found to be enhanced. 
7.1 T h e M o d e l 
The model consists of N agents. T w o M G s , labeled MGi and MG2 are played 
at the same time. The agents can participate in either one (but not both) of 
the two games at each time step. In game M G i , the agents have memory size 
m i and hold 5i strategies. In game M G 2 , the agents have memory size m? 
and hold s) strategies where the 5i strategies for M G i and S2 strategies for 
M G 2 are independent, i.e., each agent has a total 5i + S2 different strategies. 
At each time step, all agents should decide to join one of the two games 
based on the virtual points of her strategies. Let Q严 be the virtual points of 
her best strategy in game MGi, i.e., the one with the highest virtual points 
among the 5i strategies for M G i , and ft^ ^^ ^ be the virtual points of her best 
^best 
strategy in game MG'2. She will join M G i with probability b^est\^ best and 
1 2 
Qbest 
M G 2 with probability b^est\^ best. After a game is chosen, she plays the game 
1 2 
with her best strategy for the chosen game as in the basic M G . 
In each game, the room with less agents is the winning room and all the 
agents who have chosen this room are the winners. W h e n the two rooms in a 
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game have equal number of agents, the winning room is chosen randomly. All 
the winners are rewarded one real point as in the basic M G . The strategies pre-
dicted the winning room in the game that the agent participated are rewarded 
one virtual point, no matter they were used or not. No virtual points will be 
reduced for the strategies predicting the majority room. The strategies in the 
game that the agent did not join are not rewarded even if they predicted the 
winning room. In this way, an agent will have a higher probability to join the 
game in which the virtual points of her best strategy is higher. After rewarding 
virtual points, the agents repeat the same procedures in the next time step. 
7.2 Results and Discussion 
W e have performed numerical simulations for 二 = 2, m 2 = 3 and different 
values of mi, with N = 301. Figure 7.1 shows the attendance of the two games 
as a function of mi. For small values of mi, the number of participating agents 
of the two games are nearly the same. For large values of mi, the number of 
agents joining game M G i is less than the number of joining game M G 2 . 
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Figure 7.1: The number of participating agents of the two games, M G i and 
M G 2 , as a function of m i for N = 301, Si = S2 = 2, and m? = 3. 100 
independent runs are carried out for each value of mi. 
Figure 7.2 and the inset show the averaged success rate of the population as 
a function of m i for N = 301, 5i = S2 = 2, and m 2 二 3. 100 independent runs 
are carried out for each value of mi. The solid line represents an average over 
the results of 100 runs. The success rate is defined as the averaged real points 
gained per agent per turn. It is the probability that the agents win in the 
coupled games. The dashed line labeled random walk represents the average 
success rate of a population of random agents. A random agent is one who 
decides randomly in playing the games. She decides randomly on joining one of 
the two games. After a game is chosen, she decides randomly on attending one 
of the two rooms. The dot-dashed line labeled linear combination represents 
the weighted success rate of two separated M G s , game MGi and game MG2, 
with the number of agents as shown in Fig. 7.1 for given value of rui. The figure 
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shows that the success rate of the agents in the coupled games is enhanced for 
all values of mi. The population performs better than random and they do 
not behave as if they are participating two separated games. The success rate 
of the agents in the coupled games reach a m a x i m u m (see inset) at m i 二 6, 
which is also value at which the weighted success rate of two separate M G s 
(see the line labeled 'linear combination') peaks. 
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Figure 7.2: The averaged success rate of the population as a function of m i 
for N = 301, 5i = 52 = 2, and m2 = 3. 100 independent runs are carried out 
for each value of mi. The solid line represents an average over the results of 
100 runs. The dashed line labeled random walk represents the average success 
rate of a population of random agents. The dot-dashed line labeled linear 
combination represents the linear combination of the weighted success rate of 
two separated M G s , with the number of agents in each game given in Fig. 7.1. 
The inset shows the averaged success rate of the population as a function of 
m i on a smaller scale. 
W e also studied the probability of attending M G i among the agents in 
the population. Figure 7.3 shows the normalized probability density of the 
probability of joining game MGi for m i = 2 (〇)，mi=6 (•) and m i 二 10 (*). N = 
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301, Si = 52 = 2, m 2 = 3 are used. For these values of mi, the probability of 
joining M G i follows similar distributions. The distribution is broad and peaks 
at probability 0.5. The distribution shows that a significant number of agents 
always attend only one of the two games. The inset shows the normalized 
probability density of the probability of joining game M G i for a population of 
random agents. For random agents, the distribution is a Gaussian distribution, 
in accordance to random walk theory. In this case, all the random agents have 
probability 0.5 to attend M G i (or M G 2 ) . 
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Figure 7.3: The normalized probability density of the probability of joining 
game MGI for mi二2 (o), mi二6 (•) and m i = 1 0 (*). N ：二 301, 5i = 52 = 2, 
肌2 = 3 are used. 100 independent runs are carried out for each value of mi. 
The inset shows the normalized probability density of the probability of joining 
game MGI for a population of random agents. 
It is interesting to see whether an agent wins or loses more frequently by 
shifting between games. Figure 7.4 shows the success rate as a function of the 
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probability of joining game M G i for m i = 2 (o), m i二 6 (•) and m i = 1 0 (*). 
N 二 301, Si = 二 2, 7712 = 3 are used. For small mi, the extreme agents, 
i.e., those with probability of joining M G i close to 0 and 1, have a higher 
success rate than the agents who always shift between the two games. The 
behaviour is similar to that observed in the evolutionary minority game [28 . 
For all values of mi, the success rate of the agents who always attend M G 2 is 
not affected by the values of mi. The success rate of the agents who always 
attend MGi increases when mi increases from 2 to 6 and the success rate then 
decreases for further increase in mi. Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 imply that the 
change of the success rate of the overall population is due to the change of 
the success rate in MGI. In the coupled games, the success rate in MGI and 
M G 2 is enhanced comparing with the two separate M G s . 
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Figure 7.4: The success rate as a function of the probability of joining M G i 
for m i = 2 (o), m i = 6 (•) and mi二 10 (*). N = 301, = S2 二 2, m2 = 3 are 
used. 100 independent runs are carried out for each value of mi. 
The enhancement in the success rate in the coupled M G s can be explained 
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as follow. In small mi, there is doubly periodic feature in the basic M G [40 
(see also Chapter 6 for an explanation of the doubly periodic feature). In 
the coupled M G s , since NO virtual points were rewarded to the strategies of 
the game in the turns in which the agent did not attend, the accumulated 
virtual points of the strategies are DIFFERENT for different agents. It prevents 
the agents from forming crowds as in the basic M G (see Chapter 4) and thus 
enhances the success rate. O n the other hand, Fig. 7.2 shows that the cumu-
lation of virtual points for the strategies makes the agents play better than 
random agents. The cumulation of virtual points helps the agent to avoid 
attending the game she is performing worse. As the size of strategy space 
increases, the chance of forming crowds decreases. The success rate increases 
and reaches a m a x i m u m at m i 二 6. W e have checked that if the virtual points 
were rewarded to the strategies of the game in which the agent did not attend, 
the averaged success rate lowers for all values of m i and the agents perform 
poorer than random agents. 
In the large m i limit, the size of the strategy pool in game M G i is too large 
that the agents in game MGI behave as random deciding agents (which has a 
lower success rate). The effect of the values of m i on the success rate is clearly 
shown in Fig。7.4. As a result, the average success rate of the population 
decreases (see Fig. 7.2). 
7.3 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we proposed a model of coupled Minority Games. The model 
consists of N agents. In each time step, the agents play either one of the two 
games, labeled MGI and M G 2 . In MGI, the agents have memory size m i 
and hold 5i strategies. In MG'2, the agents have memory size m】and hold 
Qhest • 
52 strategies. A n agent joins M G ^ with probability h^est\^ best and M G 2 with 
probability — ， w h e r e n 严 is the virtual points of her BEST strategy in 
1 2 
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MGI and is the virtual points of her best strategy in MG�. After a 
game is chosen, she plays the game with her best strategy as in the basic M G . 
The minority room of a game is the winner room of that game. The strategies 
predicted the winning room in which the agent attended are rewarded with one 
virtual point. NO virtual points will be reduced for the strategies predicting 
the majority room. The strategies in the game that the agent did not join are 
not rewarded, even if they predicted the winning room. 
For Si 二 S2 二 2 and rrvi — 3, we found that the success rate of the 
population as a whole is enhanced for all values of mi, comparing with a 
population of random agents and two smaller separate populations playing 
two separated M G s . There are a number of agents who always join only one of 
the two games. For small mi, the extreme agents have a higher success rate. 
For large mi, the success rate of the agents who have higher probability of 
joining MGI decreases as RRII increases. The enhancement in the success rate 
is a result of not rewarding virtual points to the strategies of the game in which 
the agent did not attend, leading to different virtual points of the strategies 
for different agents. This, in turn, suppresses the formation of crowds. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we studied several problems on the physics of global behaviour 
in a competing population. Taking the financial market as an example, we 
illustrated the statistical features of the N Y S E and Shanghai indices. W e 
explored the returns distributions of the indices. For both indices, the central 
part of the distributions can be described by a Levy distribution with an 
exponent a 1.44. For large returns, the distributions exhibit a power law 
behaviour with an exponent^-4. Scaling behaviour were also demonstrated. 
With suitable scaling factor, data for different time horizons all follow the same 
functional form. In the study of the autocorrelation functions of the returns 
and the volatility of the Shanghai index, we found that the returns only show 
a short term correlation of several minutes. The volatility shows a longer term 
correlation over several days. Our results are consistent with those observed 
in other financial markets. 
W e proceeded to study possible microscopic models of competing popula-
tion. In particular, we worked on two agent based models. One is the EZ 
model proposed by Egiuluz and Zimmerman [17]. The other is the Minority 
G a m e (MG) proposed by Challet and Zhang [4 . 
W e reviewed the EZ model and some of its variations. In order to study the 
crossover behaviour in the power law exponent observed in S&P500 index, we 
proposed a model in which a cluster of agents may dissociate without making 
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a transaction. The dissociation probability is size dependent. It is higher for 
larger clusters. The returns distribution is found to depend on the parameters 
a A： cfb and s。of the model. A crossover in the power law exponent from 
-2.7 for small returns to -4 for large returns is obtained. The position for the 
crossover can also be tuned by the parameters in the model. 
W e reviewed the M G and some of its important results. W e proposed three 
new models on the M G , with the aim of exploring how an agent or a group 
of agents m a y perform better in the M G and how the population as a whole 
m a y have enhanced success rate. The first model is a biased-pool M G . It is 
a model to simulate competitions in unequal situations. In this variation, the 
probability of the occurrence of a '1' in a strategy is different from that of a 
'0'. The probability of assigning a '1' is controlled by a parameter p, where 
p > 0.5. After assigning the strategies to the agents, the game is played in 
the same way as in the basic M G . The most important feature we found for 
p > 0.50 is that in the efficient phase, the averaged success rate of the agents 
is increased. W e have performed calculations on the standard deviation of the 
difference in attendance. The analytic results agree with numerical results. W e 
have also explored the frozen agents. There are a large number of frozen agents 
at m。and the number remains unchanged as m increases. The frozen agents 
perform better than the other agents and they have a higher success rate. The 
importance of the frozen agents is that they spread themselves evenly between 
the two options. The game can then be treated as a basic M G with fewer 
agents. This leads to the shift of rrio to smaller m, as observed in numerical 
data. 
In the second model, one or a few randomly participating agent (RPA) is 
introduced in the M G . The R P A is allowed to join the game with a probability 
q in each turn. The remaining agents join the game every turn, as in the basic 
M G . The R P A sees the same history as the other agents in making prediction 
when she decides to join in a turn. For q = 0.5, numerical results show that in 
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the efficient phase, the success rate of the R P A is much higher than the other 
agents. In the inefficient phase, the success rate of the R P A is slightly lower 
than the other agents. The enhanced success rate of the R P A in the efficient 
phase is a result of the way the R P A rewards her strategies: the R P A does not 
reward virtual points to her strategies in the turns that she decides not to join 
the game. This has the effect of preventing her from adapting to the doubly 
periodic feature produced by the rest of the population. W e then explored 
the information as seen by the R P A in the efficient phase. W e defined an 
inefficiency e and carried out an analytic calculation. The result shows that 
the success rate of the R P A holding two identical strategies is related to s 
through a linear relation with slope -1, in agreement with numerical results. 
For all values of q (except ^ =1), an enhancement of success rate in the efficient 
phase is found. For Nrpa〉1, where Nrpa is the number of R P A s in the 
game, we found that the enhancement in the success rate persists up to a high 
concentration of R P A s of Nrpa/N ^ 0.6, where N is the total number of 
agents in the game. 
The third model is a model of coupled MGs。The model consists of two 
M G s . In each turn, an agent plays in either one of the two games with a 
probability proportional to the virtual points of her best strategies in that 
game. After deciding the game to join, she plays that game with her best 
strategy, as in the basic M G . The strategies in the game that the agent did 
not join would not be rewarded even if they predicted the winning room. W e 
found that the success rate of the population is enhanced, in comparison with 
random agents and agents who participate in two separated M G s . There are 
significant number of agents who always join only one of the two games. The 
enhancement in the success rate is a result of the way that virtual points to 
strategies are assigned: no virtual points are rewarded to the strategies of the 
game in which the agent did not attend. In this way, the accumulated virtual 
points of the strategies are different for all the agents. It prevents the agents 
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from forming the crowds which lead to a low success rate. 
In the three new models on the M G , we found that the performance of the 
agents are improved. The underlying physics of the enhanced performance is 
that the crowd effect is suppressed by the additional features introduced in the 
models. 
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Appendix A 
Solving Cluster Size distribution 
in EZ model 
In Chapter 3, we considered the market model proposed by Egu/luz and Zim-
mermann (EZ model). D'Hulst and Rodgers carried out an analytic study on 
the E Z model [26]. In this Appendix, we show the derivation of the cluster 
size distribution by the means of a generating function approach [26 . 
Let Us denotes the number of clusters of size s at time t. The time evolution 
of Us is given by the following equation 
dris 1 — a g , 、 2(1 - a)sns ^  , ^ . 
= -asris + —— rnr(s - rn” for s > 1 
仇 r = l r = l 
(A.l) 
and 
— = r、— 2(1 V rnr. for . = 1 (A.2) 
In the stationary state, Eq.(A.l) becomes 
^ _ ^ 5 - 1 
sris 二 ——r^ Y ] rnr{s - r ) n时 （A.3) 
(」—ajiv 二 
and Eq.(A.2) becomes 
= (A.4) 
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To solve Eqs.(A.3) and (A.4) for Us, we introduce the generating function 
oo 
g(w、二 Yrnre-誓. (A.5) 
r=2 
By using Eqs.(A.3) and (A.4), becomes 
g(wy = (2n2e—2- + 3n3e—3- + .‘.)(2n2e—2- + 3n3e—3- + ...) 
=[(l)(3)mn3e—4- + (2)(2)n_e-4- + (3)(l)n3nie-4-] 
+ [⑴⑷ + ⑶ ⑶ n 2 n 3 e—+ ⑶ ⑵ nsn^e—5 切 + ⑷ ⑴ n4nie—’ + ... 
—2(l)(3)nin3e—4切-2(1)⑷nir^e—s切—— 
= + 3n3e—3切 + 4n4e—4秘 + . •. - 2n2e一加—Snse-^") 
1 — a 
—2nie-l2n2e—2 切 + Snae"'^ + 4n4e—4 切 + ——Inie-加、 
二 ^-^Z^mgiw) - 2n2e—h — Snse"^"] — 2nie—"[乂— - 2n2e一2切] 
1 — a 
= [ l ^ N — 2n^e-^]g{w) — n^e—?-. 
1 — a 
Therefore, 
n(wf — l^^N — 2me-^]g(w) + n^e'^" = 0. (A.6) 
\ ) 1 — a 
Consider g{0) 二 I]二2”几r = N - Ui, putting w=0 and m = N - g{0) into 
Eq.(A.6) 
… 1 — a ” 
_ 二 厂 p N , 
Z — CL 
TH 二 N — g{0) = ^ N . (A.7) 
2 — a 
From Eqs.(A.6) and (A.7), we obtain 
— — ^ e l H + J ^ 广 二 0. (A.8) 
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Eq.(A.8) is a quadratic equation for g{w) and its solution is 
" 州 4(1 —a) V f { 2 - a r ' 
一 ( 2 - 4 ( 1 - g ) Q „/j^l " A 
- 4 ( 1 — a八 2  1 (^-a)^' 
_ _ 4 ( 1 ^ _ fl/2] r _ 4(1-a) i-) 
= J l - J ^ ' J / 
— _ (2 - a)N f 〒(I)! r _ l i l ^ e - H 1 (A 9) 
By comparing terms between Eq.(A.5) and Eq.(A.9) 
— 「(2 — a)7V] r 1 [一4(1 一 a)]^ 
= — L4(l-a)J |_5!(|-s)!j L (2 — a ? . 
= a - - r H 2 s - 2 v 
(2 — a 产 V ) 
After solving n^, we want to see the behaviour of n^ for large s by applying 
the Stirling's formula 
i n K ) = Injg::))二 叫 +ln(2.-2)!-21n(.)! 
- I n 叫 + (2s — In (2s — 2) + In ( 已 ” 
- - In (27r) - (25 + 1) In (s) 
[23/2^(2 —a 产—1 」 V 2乂 " 
-(3s-書)J-(2 …)In ⑷ 
�l n { [ f ^ r 叫 . 
Thus for large s, 
(A.11) 
L (2 — ay」 
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